Toward understanding insurgent success: Two cases in south Lebanon, 1968--2000

The focus of this dissertation is insurgency and the factors that contribute to successful insurgency. The topic is addressed through a comparison, based on O'Neill's variables, of two insurgencies in South Lebanon: the Palestinian insurgency against Israel (1968--1983) and the Shia-led resistance to Israeli occupation (1983--2000). The dissertation begins by addressing the research design employed and the analytical variables used in the comparative case study.; The discussion of the research design is followed by a review of the literature on insurgency and guerrilla warfare. Chapter three describes and summarizes the evolution of the PLO's insurgency against Israel, from its revolutionary guerrilla beginnings through the chaos of the Lebanese Civil War and Israel's first invasion of Lebanon in 1978. In this chapter we will see the interplay of several variables, such as the early stages of the PLO's attempt to solidify public support and a secure sanctuary. Also highlighted in this chapter will be the response to PLO activities by both the Israelis and the Lebanese government.; Chapter four examines the PLO's establishment of its sanctuary in south Lebanon, its move toward conventional warfare, and finally, its failure to hold onto its "state within a state" in south Lebanon. Key factors at play will include the Palestinian's cultivation of public support among the southern population and the PLO's implementation of its rule in the area. Special attention will also be given to the workings of the organization itself and Yasser Arafat's ill-fated decision to move toward a conventional confrontation with Israel.; Chapter five addresses the Shia-led resistance to Israeli occupation, beginning with Israel's decision to remain in Lebanon as an occupying force in 1982. Key factors addressed in this chapter will be Israel's counter-insurgency policies and the corresponding rise of Hizb'allah and the resistance. Of additional importance is Hizb'allah's decision to remain a guerrilla force, which enables the Resistance to make use of the terrain and a friendly internal sanctuary. Israel proves unable to destroy Hizb'allah, resulting in the Israeli Defense Force's withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000. The study concludes with a comparison of the cases based on the independent variables mentioned above.