| This dissertation focuses on the current debate in international relations literature over the risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. On this subject, IR scholars are divided into roughly two schools: proliferation "optimists," who argue that proliferation can be beneficial and that its associated hazards are at least surmountable, and proliferation "pessimists," who believe the opposite. This debate centers upon a theoretical disagreement about how best to explain and predict the behavior of states. Optimists generally ground their arguments on rational deterrence theory and maintain that nuclear weapons can actually increase stability among states, while pessimists often ground their arguments on "organization theory," which contends that organizational, bureaucratic, and other factors prevent states from acting rationally. A major difficulty with the proliferation debate, however, is that both sides tend to advance their respective theoretical positions without adequately supporting them with solid empirical evidence. This dissertation bridges the gap between abstract theory and empirical evidence by conducting detailed analyses of the nuclear programs in the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan to determine whether countries with nuclear weapons have adequate controls over their nuclear arsenals and fissile material stockpiles (such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium). These case studies identify the strengths and weaknesses of different systems of nuclear controls and help predict what types of controls proliferating states are likely to employ. On the basis of the evidence gathered from these cases, this dissertation concludes that a further spread of nuclear weapons would tend to have seriously negative effects on international stability by increasing risks of accidental, unauthorized, or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons and risks of thefts of fissile materials for use in nuclear or radiological devices by aspiring nuclear states or terrorist groups. |
