| Historically, sovereign states have determined what is legally permissible within their own borders. But globalization blurs sovereignty and challenges state governance capacity. And transnational criminal organizations arbitrage inter-state policy differences to put themselves beyond the reach of the law. In particular, they use the international financial system to launder the proceeds of crime. This study focuses the efforts of the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to contain transnational crime through a global anti-money laundering regime.; The study examines the strategic foundations of the FATF regime and its likely efficacy in the context of world politics. A model of international policy bargaining provides the conceptual framework. Three basic causal variables (state power, interests, policy values), mediated by the FATF, give the regime its shape.; The study is quasi-experimental. I use both OLS and logistic regression to examine variation between FATF and non-FATF states with respect to policy cooperation and strategy coordination. Within the FATF, I use the tools of game theory to develop a causal link between policy cooperation and internal organizational processes. To assess likely regime efficacy, I use OLS regression to analyze early implementation efforts.; The evidence suggests FATF policy coordination efforts have increased risks to money laundering organizations, thus potentially reducing the supply of crime. FATF nations are systematically more cooperative in matters of relevant legal procedure; and they have systematically aligned the substance of national criminal justice and regulatory policies, thus reducing arbitrage opportunities. The FATF has enforced the regime with organizational processes that facilitate cooperation and organizational learning. Initial United States implementation efforts suggest traffickers may face greater risk of detection. However, cooperation may depend on attenuated sovereignty claims, and policy values associated with Western liberalism, including the rule of law, property rights, contract enforcement, and high quality public administration. Absent shared policy values or workable issue linkages, FATF states may attempt coercive enforcement measures. |
