| The analog vs. digital distinction is frequently used in computer science, computer technology and elsewhere. However, its precise nature is more elusive than might be expected. This dissertation defines a set of problems hidden within the conventions of ordinary and technical language, and suggests solutions to them.; Chapter 1 examines ordinary language uses of the analog-digital distinction. Chapter 2 considers its use in technical contexts. There are two main ways of making the distinction that appear in both of the opening chapters. The most common is to take it to be equivalent to that between the continuous and the discrete. These two terms are typically used to differentiate either a physical medium, such as the continuous grooves of a vinyl record or the discrete bubbles in a compact disc, or some form of notation by means of which a phenomenon is represented. Systems of discrete characters, such as alphabets, provide means of digital representation, whereas diagrams and figures operate as means of analog representation. It has frequently been argued that an analog representation relies on some form of natural resemblance to what is being represented. As the word suggests, analogy, i.e., a similarity of structure, is the prime candidate to explain this kind of resemblance. In contrast, digital representation requires a conventional means of correlation, which in turn requires a translation manual, to establish the relationship between the notation and what is represented.; Chapter 3 shows that the various distinctions considered in the previous chapters have consequences for arguments in the philosophy of mind.; Chapter 4 presents a literature survey. Chapter 5 extends the picture developed in the opening chapters beyond the philosophy of mind.; The importance of this dissertation lies in its response to a question basic to both philosophy of mind and philosophy of language: how do representations work? Traditional theories of representation have tended to be functional in their descriptions of representations. By contrast, recent developments in cognitive science have offered structural descriptions. Clearly, these two modes parallel the analog-digital distinction. This dissertation, in clarifying the distinction, provides important clues for bridging these two contemporary philosophical movements. |
