| This dissertation investigates how states react to other states' military practices. These reactions fall into three categories: emulation, where the new practice is partially or wholly mimicked; off-setting, where the reacting state acts to counter the effects of new military practice; and no change from previous plans, where the potential responder decides not to respond to the information concerning the new military practice being demonstrated. Two explanations are developed and tested in this dissertation: a neo-realist model suggesting that how a state responds to the demonstration of new military practices will depend on the external strategic constraints that it faces; and an organizational model arguing that reactions will be determined by the organizationally derived preferences of military officers. Using the qualitative methodologies of structured focused comparison and process tracing, the two models are tested against the cases of American and Soviet armor development in the interwar period. The conclusion reached is that while both models explain elements of the cases, the neo-realist model is the more robust of the two candidate explanations. In the long run, how states respond to other states' military practices will largely depend on: the threat posed and opportunity offered by the new practice to the reacting state; the quality of information the state has about the new practice, which in turn will usually be a function of the demonstration context in which the state learned about the practice; and the likelihood and severity of war.; This dissertation speaks to several current and important theoretical debates, including the merits of neo-realist and organizational theories of foreign policy; the levels of analysis debate; and the proper relationship between materialist and ideational explanations. The study also has significant policy implications, providing information on the prevention and amelioration of weapons proliferation, arms racing, and the security dilemma; and the provision of efficient security policy. |
