The concept of 'Type C' coercive diplomacy: United States policy towards Nicaragua during the Reagan Administration, 1981--1988

During the 1980s, the Reagan Administration applied a number of coercive measures against Nicaragua and, after ten years of enduring US pressures, the Sandinistas agreed to conduct internationally supervised democratic elections---which they lost. While many Reagan Administration supporters claim that US policy was ultimately responsible for the outcome, other factors were also at work. Consequently, this research will employ a case study method to answer such questions as, to what extent were US pressures responsible for the defeat of the Sandinista revolution? What are the limits of using a strategy of coercive diplomacy when the ultimate goal is to cause regime change?; Coercive diplomacy is defined as the threat of force or the demonstrative use of limited force designed to persuade an adversary to accept stated demands. Existing scholarly literature argues that coercive diplomacy may be used for two general purposes: Type A seeks to persuade an adversary to stop objectionable behavior; and, Type B seeks to undo an action that has already been completed. I argue here, however, that there also exists Type C coercive diplomacy, which seeks to achieve a third and more difficult task: to persuade the leadership of another country to voluntarily relinquish power and/or to force a fundamental change in their form of government. Unlike other uses of coercive diplomacy, this Type C variant does not confine itself to regime behavior, but rather seeks to replace the regime itself; This research demonstrates that coercive diplomacy is difficult to pursue successfully. If it can be made to work, however, it is a much less costly way of achieving national objectives. Unfortunately, this potential to achieve objectives "on the cheap" may entice policymakers to use coercive diplomacy even in situations where there is little probability for success. Indeed, this research further demonstrates that the success of Type C coercive diplomacy is dependent upon the existence of a number of pre-conditions to include: (1) the motivation of the adversary to resist is mitigated by the existence of tolerable alternatives; (2) the adversary perceives a sense of urgency to comply with stated demands; (3) the adversary fears the threatened escalation; and, (4) the adversary believes that the coercing power has usable military options. While the existence of the above pre-conditions do not guarantee success, the absence of one or more increases the probability that the US will be unable to accomplish its objectives without using decisive military power.