The economics of plant genetic resources: The effects of alternative intellectual property protection systems and advances in biotechnology

This dissertation addresses issues on intellectual property rights in plant genetic resources and the management of genebanks under the rapid advances in biotechnology. Chapter 1 discusses the institutional aspects of intellectual property rights on plant genetic resources and possible mechanisms for implementing farmers' rights. By comparing alternatives means of protection for plant genetic resources, including plant breeders' rights, utility patents, and trade secrets, this chapter lays a ground for the theoretical analysis in chapter 2. This chapter also examines debates on farmers' rights and possible mechanisms for implementing farmers' rights.; Chapter 2 analyzes the dynamic effect of patent systems when innovation is cumulative. The development process of a new variety in agriculture provides a typical example of cumulative innovation, and the initiation of intellectual property protection for plant genetic resources requires a dynamic analysis. Using a highly stylized dynamic model, we show that the choices of patent life and royalty rate that optimize worldwide dynamic social welfare can be quite different from the values that maximize the steady-state social welfare. We also show that recognition of farmers' rights entails a dynamic welfare loss to producers and consumers not revealed in a comparative statics analysis. This implication may prove instructive in forming intellectual property protection policy in more complex environments.; Chapter 3 examines the use and management of genebank materials under the environments of rapid technological advances. The optimal timing of the evaluation of genebank material and the effect of technological advances are analyzed. We found that for a trait with sufficiently low frequency, it is more cost effective not to evaluate the trait until the need is pressing. We also show that advances in biotechnology favor ex ante evaluation, and moreover the possibility of a technological breakthrough in development may speed up the timing of evaluation and development, contrary to the usual argument of real option theory in which a possible future technological breakthrough delays the current decision.