| In 1948 the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe began an economic and military blockade against Yugoslavia intended to force the Yugoslav Communist regime under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito to abandon its independent policies. This move threatened not only Yugoslav independence, but also much needed economic development. To overcome these difficulties Yugoslav leaders gradually established closer cooperation with the United States. Since the Yugoslav Communists had previously been convinced of the Soviet model's efficacy and of America's imperialistic nature, this shift toward the United States required a profound change in attitude. However, no studies have yet explained how this transformation was conceived and then carried out by Yugoslav leaders.; Hence, this dissertation examines the origins, course, and consequences of Yugoslavia's relationship with the United States during the crucial period from 1949 to 1957 when the Cold War most affected the historical fortunes of Yugoslavia. Abundant financial and military aid from the United States made it possible for the Yugoslavs to undertake an ambitious program of economic development and at the same time to maintain one of the largest military forces in Europe. Ultimately Yugoslavia emerged at the end of the decade with a rapidly expanding economy and with immense international influence that belied its size. Such developments helped to justify and to consolidate the existence of Yugoslavia as a national entity. Yugoslav leaders were successful in large part because of the unique circumstances of the Cold War, but also because they maintained relatively pragmatic and flexible policies that allowed them to manipulate those circumstances to Yugoslavia's maximum advantage. This study is based primarily on Yugoslav government documents and the personal papers of Edvard Kardelj located in the Archive of Slovenia (Ljubljana, Slovenia), and on U.S. State Department records from published volumes as well as from the National Archives (Washington, D.C.). |