| This dissertation explores the intersection of law and ethics by examining the conceptions the United States Supreme Court has had of press responsibility over time. Its theoretical framework uses four components: the legal philosophical debate between natural law and legal positivism, the distinction in media studies between liberalism and social responsibility, and the dichotomies of liberalism/conservatism and affirmative/negative conceptions of freedom within political philosophy.;Several conclusions are made regarding the Court and press responsibility. First, the Court focuses primarily on the political and educational functions of the press and the ethical principles of truth telling, stewardship, humaneness, and equal treatment in its concrete conceptions of press responsibility. Second, several general trends were apparent over time. For example, from 1969 to 1991, as the Supreme Court became more conservative, it increasingly demanded more responsibility of the press. This was particularly apparent during the final years examined. Third, overall the Court treated press freedom not as a right (though it used rights language when discussing press freedom) but as a collective social obligation. This was seen in the justices' use of the political and educational functions to rationalize--and consequently limit--press freedom.;A major conclusion of this examination of Supreme Court conceptions of press responsibility, therefore, is that while there exists in Court press cases much discussion about press freedom and responsibility, discussion that uses both absolutist language and the language of rights, the Court has actually viewed press freedom not as a right protected in and of itself, but as a means to a free and just society. The press is protected because of its role in attaining and maintaining that society, and therefore has responsibilities to attempt to achieve that goal. In giving this reason for protecting the press, the Court makes press freedom into a social policy rather than a right or principle. And in so doing, it opens the way for requirements of responsibility. |
