The United States and Kenya, 1978--1985: The limits of influence in a patron-client relationship

Through a case study of the patron-client relationship between the United States and Kenya from 1978--1985, the work examines critically the assumption that aid garners substantial patron influence over weak clients. Exploring historically both U.S. and Kenyan motivations for the relationship, formalized in the 1980 Rapid Deployment Force agreement, the study asks whether Kenya was required to conform substantially to U.S. goals in return for arms and aid. The evidence suggests not. Three U.S. goal areas (or, conversely, areas of Kenyan compliance) are examined: (1) Strategic advantage---Here, though there was some compliance (or cooperation) on the part of Kenya, the government was allowed latitude to pursue contradictory policies and furthermore, exercised "reverse leverage" over U.S. policy. Further, objective strategic value was limited. (2) International solidarity ---characterized by conformity of stances in international forums, public consultations between leaders, and the world perception of association between the two countries. Kenya's compliance here was decidedly mixed. (3) Domestic/ideological conformity---particularly in the realm of human rights and permission of political freedom in Kenya. Kenya was especially noncompliant here and was allowed substantial latitude with no serious threat of aid cutoff. In the end, the payoff for the U.S. was low in relation to the resources invested.; A central lesson is that, in the search for small clients, aid should be conservatively channeled toward those states that can yield a tangible strategic payoff. Lawmakers should be extremely skeptical when told aid promises an influence "package" comprising the above features.