| This dissertation examines the fundamental causes of arms acquisition and tests the relationship between security and arms buildup. The author formulated a post-structural theoretical framework of what constitutes the strategic security environment by unifying competing concepts, in pursuit of a contemporary and broadly accepted notion of causes of insecurity. The framework was empirically applied to three specific cases: Pre- and Post apartheid South Africa and the state of Israel.; This investigation of weapons acquisition and its relationship to a particular security environment is shaped by a careful review of the theoretical literature on security, national defense and interest, and on the empirical data derived from the three cases identified above.; The study identifies six causal variables that are pertinent in explaining the relationship of a country's security environment and its pattern of weapons acquisition. They are: (1) the neorealist structural anarchy; (2) historical circumstances; (3) demographic composition; (4) geopolitics; (5) national motivations; and (6) norms and identity. The theoretical and empirical evidence utilized in this dissertation affirm two central hypotheses: (a) that an unstable or threatening environment does not enhance a state's quest for security but instead propels it toward aggressive/chronic weapons acquisition; and (b) without ameliorating or eliminating the causes of insecurity in a state's strategic security environment, the realization of regional or global arms control seems unattainable. The historical evidence also shows that neither armament, which sometimes metastasize the problem of insecurity, nor arms control has ensured sustainable security. This study, therefore, concludes that to prevent war and guarantee long-term security, the (state/non-state) causations of distrust, threat, and instability must be addressed. |
