Economic liberalism

This dissertation explores some of the moral issues attendant to government regulation of commercial affairs. I begin by exploring the liberal philosophical writings of John Locke, David Hume, and John Stuart Mill. From these sources I develop principles that would justify an activist state concerned with citizen's economic liberty and autonomy. I combine these principles into a philosophical theory that I dub 'economic liberalism.' The central tenant of this theory is a concept I call ideally free markets---markets that do not interfere with the economic liberty or autonomy of economic actors. Economic liberalism calls for government intervention in otherwise unconstrained markets to achieve ideally free ones. However, such intervention must be done in such a fashion that is consistent with other principles of economic liberalism---namely a respect for rights, the equal standing of all citizens, and without arbitrary assertion of state power.;Next, I subject my concept of economic liberalism to the criticism of competing philosophical theories of market regulation. I analyze Michael Walzer's communitarian, Elizabeth Anderson's theory of rational value, and Tibor Machan's libertarian approach to market regulation. My object in each case is to understand the implications these competing approaches have for economic liberalism. In some cases it is necessary for me to amend or elaborate the principles of economic liberalism. And in other cases I defend economic liberalism against these competing views.;Finally, I offer an example of actual market regulation in order to further test and develop the abstract philosophical principles of economic liberalism. I explain the regulatory framework of the securities industry as embodied in the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934. I claim that these acts are examples of intrusive government intervention consistent with the moral principles of economic liberalism. I then isolate aspects of this regulation that violate certain libertarian moral principles. And I argue that (in this case) libertarian principles should not be controlling. Rather, I claim that the regulation of the securities industry is erected upon the morally justified moral foundation of economic liberalism.