Canadian shield: Canada's national security strategy and nuclear weapons, 1951-1971

Why did a country small in population, geographically removed from the sources of world conflict and with no territorial ambitions acquire and then divest herself of a comprehensive nuclear delivery capability? The debate over the role of nuclear weapons in Canadian national security policy has been influenced by aspects of the apparent Canadian subservience to a dominant United States. Some scholars believe that the Soviet threat was exaggerated for American economic purposes, and that NATO was strictly an American tool to execute a malevolent economic agenda. If one adheres to this perspective, it follows that the national interests of American allies did not exist. This is a completely unrealistic proposition since influence is not a zero-sum game and Canada was able to define and protect her interests despite a predominance of American power.;Canada acquired nuclear weapons to influence her allies as well as her enemies. Canadian aims were not grandiose ones. Canadian policymakers wanted peace, freedom, and economic prosperity for the Canadian people. Canadian national aims within NATO revolved around selecting the best strategic concept to deter the Soviet threat and by implementing measures to create a Canadian force structure that could participate in Alliance strategy. The fact that Canadian national security policy aims coincided with American national security policy aims at times does not prove that Canada was duped or manipulated, nor does it prove that Canada was an American satellite. These facts were demonstrated by Canada's positive, and at times effective, participation in both the NATO and NORAD strategic processes.;Canada used a combination of techniques to exert influence. There were close strategic, technical, and operational special relationships among Canada's armed forces and those of the United States, Britain, and West Germany. These relationships, activated by the commitment of salient Canadian forces, were used in a concerted effort to exert Canadian political influence on NATO in general and on the United States in particular. At times Canada also adopted obstructionist tactics in an effort to pressure the Americans. Another approach involved the use of geography as an influence tool.;The problem for Canada was that using these methods required a robust national security policymaking apparatus that had long-term interests as the basis for its activity, as well as effective military input in the process. Canada started to create such an apparatus, led by Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee General Charles Foulkes and Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson. The apparatus was marginalized by 1963 by infighting within John G. Diefenbaker's government (to include an External Affairs faction consisting of Howard Green and Norman Robertson, a National Defence faction led by Douglas Harkness and Frank Miller, with the mercurial Prime Minister Diefenbaker in the middle). The existing apparatus was eventually dismantled by Pierre Trudeau's government in 1972. This ensured that the critical understanding of the relationship between influence, operational forces and national interests could not be communicated by the professional military representatives to the unelected civilian bureaucracy and the elected civilian officials. The purpose of the armed forces was even called into question. There was no adequate reply, which resulted in the dismantling of Canada's nuclear capability.