From UN to NATO peace-enforcement interventions: The Balkan debacle as NATO's 'experimental laboratory'

This study identifies and analyzes the key conditions for and causes of NATO's success rate in conducting multinational military peace-enforcement interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. As its baseline it uses the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia. Subsequently, it evaluates the IFOR/SFOR operation in Bosnia and the NATO air campaign OAF and the ground campaign KFOR in Kosovo.; First, the study evaluates available data to indicate the effectiveness of the military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo as related to achieving primary and secondary security objectives. Primary security objectives are broadly measured in terms of containing military force-on-force fighting, while the secondary ones are measured in terms of containing violence against civilians.; Second, the study evaluates how five specific factors--- motive, strategy, capabilities and means, willingness, and civil-military security cooperation and coordination---have affected NATO's ability to achieve security-related objectives. Subsequently, lessons learned are evaluated according to the rate of change in data and effectiveness identified within the subsequent operations.; NATO is found to have mostly reached primary security objectives while not reaching the secondary ones. The reason for this is reflected in different degrees in the way NATO performed in regards to the five crucial factors.; The following general observations/recommendations are reported: (1) NATO succeeded in containing military fighting, while the level of violence against civilians stayed the same or increased regardless of NATO involvement throughout the cases. (2) Ground troops are a necessity in order to control civilian violence, thereby providing public security. (3) If deterrence does not work, compellence strategies must be employed (by ground troops exclusively or by a combination of ground troops and airpower). (4) Both compellence and deterrence strategies fail without the necessary means and capabilities. (5) If military forces do not have the willingness to compel or deter violence against civilians, the mission will fail! (6) If the military is incapable or unwilling, security conducts must be coordinated with other (CIVPOL) security forces. (7) If no intervening security entity is willing to take risks/casualties, neither compellence nor deterrence will work! (8) Never assume that an approach that worked before will necessarily work again somewhere else. (9) Always have ready-to-be-launched contingency plans available. (10) Prepare to fight unconventional asymmetrical 'enemies', which requires special skills and preparations.