Culpability and consequences: A study of felony murder

Under the "felony murder rule," when a death occurs during the commission of a felony, the perpetrators of that felony, whatever their role in causing the death, may be prosecuted for first degree murder. This work examines the implications of such prosecutions for criminal justice theory and practice.;I studied the prosecution of homicides in Alameda County, California through participant observation and statistical analysis to bring empirical data to bear on the questions raised by the debate over the felony murder rule. The data indicate that use of the rule significantly influences the outcomes of homicide prosecutions: variations in the culpability of felony killing defendants are ignored, and felony killing defendants are penalized more severely than are other murder defendants although they are no more culpable. Nor is prosecution under the rule an incidental matter: the theory of felony murder is the predominant basis for convicting offenders of first degree murder in Alameda County; and, most death sentences nationally are based on the felony murder theory.;The findings suggest that the felony murder rule is not merely an aberration in the criminal law with effects confined to an insignificant subset of cases. Rather, the elements of felony murder define in practice the crime of murder in the first degree. Thus a general problem in criminal justice theory is created by the conflict between the basis for punishment provided by the rule and the principles of culpability and proportionality identified by legal theorists as properly governing the imposition of punishment.;The provisions of the felony murder rule clash with the notions of justice and fairness that are said to furnish the moral ground for the criminal law and its administration. The importance of the rule in the criminal justice system points to a need to reexamine homicide law as a whole. In particular, we should ask whether the commission of a felony is an appropriate basis for attributing responsibility for accidental deaths, whether felony murder ought to be the standard for murder in the first degree, and whether utilitarian considerations alone represent acceptable grounds for imposing criminal penalties.