Evolving beyond the security dilemma: Did the major European powers use reciprocity during the Cold War

This dissertation investigates interstate reciprocity both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, it explains why states, acting as individuals, would use reciprocity in many kinds of iterated dyadic relationships, not just iterated prisoner's dilemmas. It also shows how states could overcome the problem of using reciprocity in noisy environments by acting cautiously. Empirically, it provides overwhelming evidence that the U.S., Britain, France, Germany and the USSR did cautiously reciprocate one another's behavior between 1949 and 1978. In nearly every one of the twenty directed dyad examined, the probability a state initiates a cooperative action is both negatively related to its own past level of cooperation and positively related to its dyadic partner's level of cooperation. The same basic relation holds true in the case of dyadic hostility. However, these results confirming dyadic reciprocity only hold if third-party influences are included in the investigation. For example, to confirm the existence of U.S.-British reciprocity, France's, Germany's and the Soviet's past interactions with the U.S., Britain, and with one another must be controlled for. Also included is a preliminary study which examines how France, Germany and the Soviet Union influenced U.S.-British cooperation during the Cold War. The dissertation concludes by discussing the importance of these findings on the study of international relations.