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The Budget Paradox: Simultaneous Stability and Volatility in the Army's Budget

Posted on:2012-12-20Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:Harvard UniversityCandidate:Brockmann, Heidi AnnFull Text:PDF
GTID:1469390011462627Subject:Political science
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Aggregate agency budgets are steady, predictable, and adhere closely to the theory of incrementalism, experiencing small changes from year to year during the congressional budget review process. But funding data from the Army's procurement and research and development accounts over six fiscal years demonstrate that individual program budget outcomes are often highly volatile and unpredictable, not incremental. The Pentagon's complex acquisition process, defense industry's singular focus on profits, and traditional congressional interests in local economic benefits all contribute to volatile program funding and constrain the Army's efforts to manage and defend its budget request. Records of Army officials' engagements with Congress over four fiscal years reveal that the number and type of engagements, or even whether engagement occurs at all, cannot guarantee stable program funding outcomes. Instead, the Army may better achieve its budgetary objectives by improving the quality of congressional engagements and proposing incremental changes to program funding.
Keywords/Search Tags:Budget, Program funding, Army's
PDF Full Text Request
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