Poverty, education, and intrahousehold bargaining: Evidence from China

This dissertation analyzes decision-making and education within resource-constrained households using household survey data collected by the author in rural China. Low income and incomplete credit markets make financing educational investments difficult in poor areas even when the returns to education exceed the costs. These problems are compounded by low educational attainment of parents which makes them less likely to educate their own children. Low educational attainment of women also may undermine their bargaining positions within the household, affecting household decisions about children's education if parental preferences differ.; "Education and Poverty in Rural China" investigates the effects of poverty, credit constraints, intrahousehold bargaining, and school quality on education. Results show that a lack of credit hampers financing education but does not affect school performance. By contrast, wealth positively impacts test scores. Higher parental education and women's decision-making authority reduce the probability of children repeating grades. The latter also reduces the probability that children drop out of school. School quality has a modest effect on the duration of schooling.; "Dowry and Intrahousehold Bargaining: Evidence from China" analyzes the relationship between a woman's intrahousehold bargaining position and her welfare within marriage. Simultaneity problems common to the literature are overcome by using dowry to proxy for bargaining position. Omitted variable bias is addressed by using grain shocks in the year preceding marriage and sibling sex composition as instruments for dowry. Instrumented dowry positively impacts several measures of a wife's welfare, including time allocation, household purchases, and the wife's decision-making authority, thereby offering strong evidence to support collective models of the household.; "Parental Education and Child Learning: Investing in Goods and Time" examines the robust empirical relationship between parental education and children's human capital acquisition. First, demand functions for investments in children's human capital production are estimated. Results show that more educated parents make greater investments in both goods and time. Next, a production function for children's test scores is estimated. Controlling for investments in time and goods reduces the estimated effects of parental education modestly, suggesting that instruments account for some, but not all, of the positive relationship between parental education and child learning.