| The political use of force is generally assumed to be the product of well thought-out decisions, where US presidents defend the nation's most vital interests. However, in recent cases leaders were reluctantly drawn to intervene through a sequence of short-term events. They found themselves in situations they would rather have avoided, from which they sought a way out through military means. These were cases in which American presidents initially discarded forceful intervention because of the absence of a vital interest, only to have that decision reversed at a later point. These were also interventions of choice, where the US was not compelled to intervene, but rather chose to do so. In these situations ambiguity remained a pervasive factor throughout the crisis, clouding the definition of stakes and costs.; Where do leaders turn to when they lack the guidance of hard variables to assess the presence of a vital stake? How can we account for the sudden "discovery" of a national interest when in the leader's initial account there wasn't any? The response articulated here is based on the findings of prospect theory, and can be summarized as follows. In the absence of a vital interest, the decision to intervene in the periphery will be driven primarily from the situational context from which the decision is made. Desperate situations alter substantially the way leaders assess alternative prospects, making them willing to accept choices that offer the promise of recouping recent losses, albeit at the price of higher uncertainty and risk. If that bold decision goes awry, leaders will become hostage of their previously chosen course of action, and will tend to overcome difficulties by investing further resources. Instead of adjusting the chosen means so as to reach strategic ends, they will cling stubbornly to failing ventures: policies will be reified and turned into ends in themselves. Incoming information that proves their assumptions wrong will be denied, as readjusting or de-escalating would imply accepting failure.; This argument is tested in the cases of Lebanon (1982), Somalia (1992), and Bosnia (1995). The study concludes by making some recommendations to policy-makers. |
