This dissertation provides an empirical evaluation of market structure reforms that have been implemented in the Electric Power Industry between 1980 and 1999. The analysis is based on the experience of Latin American countries and to some extent of OECD countries. Market structure reforms pose certain tradeoffs. Economic theory suggests that such tradeoffs depend on parameters that can only be estimated econometrically. The tradeoffs arise in industries where vertical relationships between production layers result from the interaction between competitive markets and regulated markets. The implications of different structural arrangements can be clarified by empirical work. This comparative analysis of the recent international experience in the electric power industry addresses these implications. The results of this research support the claim that vertical separation between generation, transmission and distribution is the most efficient regulatory regime, and, as such, a central feature of reform processes in the electric power industry. The empirical analysis uses the distance function as an analytical tool to estimate relative efficiency for each market structure arrangement. For this purpose, the present study assembles a panel set covering 40 countries during a 20-year period. |