Beyond food fights: How international institutions promote agricultural trade liberalization (Japan)

In a comparative study of Japanese and European trade policy, this dissertation explains how the institutional context of negotiations affects political outcomes. I examine two pathways by which negotiation structure promotes liberalization: issue linkage and legal framing. Broadening stakes through issue linkage mobilizes domestic lobbying for liberalization. Use of GATT/WTO trade law in dispute settlement legitimizes arguments favoring liberalization. The research addresses the theoretical debates in the field regarding how interdependence and the legalization of international affairs change the nature of state interaction. It contributes to our understanding of comparative foreign policy by comparing the response to foreign pressure by Japan and the European Union.; I test my argument in the sensitive area of agricultural trade policy. Statistical analysis of U.S. negotiations with Japan and the EU from 1970 to 1999 indicates that an institutionalized issue linkage makes liberalization more likely for both Japan and Europe. This is the most important source of leverage for negotiating agricultural liberalization. However, the effect of GATT/WTO legal pressure interacts with the political context. In detailed case studies which incorporate interviews and archival research, I examine how different domestic actors respond to incentives arising from the negotiation context. In Japan, trade interests and respect for international law motivate leaders to favor policies congruent with international trade rules. The EU, however, faces a conflict between the goals of integration and free trade, while the narrow focus of adjudication provokes deadlock within the EU decision-making process for agricultural policy. I conclude that domestic political processes make Japan more responsive to pressure from trade rules than the European Union.