| Supply chain coordination and associated contracts have been an active research area for supply chain management research. Yet, little has been done in addressing robustness matters of design, evaluation, and implementation for these coordination contracts. In chapter 2 and 3, we develop a consistency framework for supply chain contracts and classify a number of well-studied contracts into groups. We demonstrate with examples that coordination contracts can be evaluated by their consistency properties. Based on precise mathematical definitions and subsequently developed structural properties and management insights, we are not only able to measure the goodness of supply contracts but also to reveal the nature of their coordination. Our findings open an avenue for design, evaluation and implementation of supply chain coordination contracts.;In Chapter 4, we consider a supply chain which consists of a manufacturer, a logistics service provider (LSP) and a retailer. The LSP provides the emergency replenishment, financing and logistics services. The advent of the LSP changes the structure and incentive in the traditional one-supplier-one-retailer channel. We develop a framework of 3-player game to investigate the dynamics and competitive behaviors with multiple decision sequences. We provide the explicit equilibria for different decision sequences and demonstrate the possibility that the LSP and the manufacturer collude to create price increment, which squeezes out the retailer. Whereas, the triple marginalization effect is alleviated. |
