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Optimize The Supply Chain Contract Logistics Services, Supply Chain Capabilities And Coordination

Posted on:2010-12-10Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:A P CuiFull Text:PDF
GTID:1119360302962170Subject:Transportation planning and management
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With the enhancement of economy globalization, enterprises is facing the pressure of the rapidly changing demands, shorter delivery lead-time, lower cost and better service, which develops the principal competition of enterprises nowadays—the supply chain management. Meanwhile, supply chain management research already expands from the product/material supply chain to the service supply chain due to rapid development of the service industry and its more and more important role in the growth of economy. Taking logistics service supply chain (LSSC) as research object, this dissertation studies its evolution mechanism, structural model, characteristics, gaining of logistics capability (LC) and coordination profoundly and systematically. Above all, the key point of this dissertation is how to coordinate LSSC through LC optimization with supply chain contracts as coordination mechanism and to provide the theoretical reference for logistics operation practice. Main research contents and conclusions of this dissertation are as following:(1) The evolution mechanism, characteristics, structural model, and basic management theories and methods of LSSC are firstly analyzed qualitatively and systematically on the basis of literatures review of service supply chain in this dissertation, which provides a theoretical framework for further study. Results show that LSSC presents its special double-evolution model driven by social division and specialization, transaction cost reduction and core-competence-refocused. LSSC is a capability chain and a value-added service chain, which integrates logistics resources mainly through supply contracts. Therefore, gaining and integrating of LC is the key to LSSC optimization. Furthermore, some basic methods of LSSC management such as supply contracts, incentive mechanism and relation-specific assets investment etc, are applied in practice. Coordination mechanisms are needed to ensure relational coordination based on core competence division and cooperation of members in LSSC such as relation-specific assets investment, knowledge-sharing routines.(2) The optimal capability reservation and investment strategy existing between logistics service integrator (LSI) and logistics service subcontractor (LSS) is studied in this dissertation by taking sufficient supply of LSS's capability, random logistics service demand and suffering of both LSI and LSS for capability shortage into consideration. Return contract, as a classical supply contract, is applied to coordinate LSSC based on newsboy model and three different scenarios are considered including LSI-led non-cooperative Stackelberg game, LSS4ed non-cooperative Stackelberg game and cooperative game according to different allocation of contract decision-making power.Traditional return contract, which is provided by LSS to LSI, can make channel coordination come true in LSSC in non-cooperative LSS-led scenario, and that, LSSC only can be Pareto-improved if return contracts based on Stackelberg game model which is applied as another non-cooperative mechanism. But simulation result shows that the optimal strategies equilibrium is not stable just because LSS, as leader in LSSC, tends to apply return contracts based on Stackelberg game model to coordinate LSSC for he can seize more profit than that under traditional return contracts through first move advantage and ultimate decision-making power.In non-cooperative LSI-led scenario, LSI can obtain advantageous position through announcing the potential LC quantity which can give an impact on the capability sale price of LSS. That's to say, LSI achieves the optimal LC reservation quantity through taking maximal LC reservation quantity as decision variable to influence the capability sale price of LSS. Both the optimal quantity of maximal LC reservation and the optimal quantity of actual capability reservation of LSI ascend with the reinforcement of the sensitivity of LSI's LC reservation quantity to the capability sale price of LSS. The expected profit of LSI and LSS rises with the reinforcement of this sensitivity when it is at lower level. However, LSS's expected profit descends when this sensitivity is at upper level, but LSI's on the contrary. At the same time, the advantageous position of LSI is upgraded with the reinforcement of this sensitivityIn cooperative bargaining game scenario, K-S solution is applied to determine the optimal LC reservation strategy of LSI and the optimal LC sale price of LSS according to the benefit allocation principle of LSI's and LSS's contribution to LSSC alliance, which ensures that LSS and LSI are apt to cooperate with each other and thus helps LSSC reach the optimal situation. The benefit allocation within reasonable range between LSS and LSI depends on the bargaining power of each part.(3) Considering a LSSC system including one LSI and one LSS, zero original LC of LSS and suffering of both LSI and LSS for capability shortage, this dissertation proposes a kind of coordination mechanism based on options contract to solve LC reservation and investment problem in LSSC.In symmetric information scenario, LC in LSSC can be optimized perfectly and the expected profit of both LSSC system and the parties increases through options contract proposed in Stackelberg game model and thus LSSC is channel-coordinated. Results showthat the negative linear relationship exists between two option parameters——option priceand option execute price, and the value of option price, which determines the allocation of surplus system expected profit between LSI and LSS, must be located in a reasonable scope as the core element of contract parameters under channel coordination.In asymmetric information scenario, this dissertation assumes that capability operation cost of LSS is the private information for LSI. In the purpose of maximizing his expected profit, LSI tries to apply Myerson information revelation principle and signal game to stimulate LSS to show LSS's true cost information for pursuit of optimal expected profit through controlling the decision-making power of optimal original LC reservation quantity and LC option quantity. Result shows that LSI can obtain true cost information of LSS through options contract and information revelation principle in this situation and options contract can coordinate LSSC just for it can improve the efficiency of LSSC system effectively.This dissertation considers further that LSI is a risk-averse party on the basis of asymmetric cost information of LSS, and applies mean-variance method to describe risk-averse degree of LSI. Two-constraint programming model is established in pursuit of simulating to reveal true cost information and control risk, and the optimal LC reservation and investment strategy for LSI and LSS can be given by optimization method and graphic solution. Result shows that not only true cost information of LSS can be revealed, but also demand risk of LSI can be controlled effectively through capability-option contract given by LSI as buyer and thus can help LSSC achieve a Pareto improvement subject to two constraints given above. However, the improvement efficiency depends on the anti-risk capability of LSI. That's to say, the optimal LC reservation quantity increases with respect to the increase of LSI's anti-risk capability, and even reaches the level of the situation only considered asymmetric information of LSS.(4) An incomplete relational contract is introduced to analyze specific LC reservation and investment problem, and effective simulation mechanism is proposed to solve hold-up problem and moral hazard problem in LSSC in this dissertation. The situation of non-specific LC investment only by LSS in pursuit of decreasing logistics service cost is firstly considered. Not far to seek, this kind of investment just takes the benefit of LSS into account, but cannot bring direct benefit to LSI, which does not result in the appearance of specific investment hold-up problem and opportunism behavior of LSI. The optimal level of LC investment in leader-follower game between LSI and LSS is a half of the level in cooperative game between two parties, which means that LC underinvestment problem exists and LSSC cannot be channel-coordinated in non-cooperative game. Secondly, only one specific LC investment of LSS with the purpose of improving his logistics service quality is considered in LSSC. Specific LC investment level cannot reach the global optimization of LSSC when LSI provides fixed incentive contract to specific LC investment of LSS. The optimal specific LC investment level of LSS under linear incentive contract is higher than the level under fixed incentive contract in spite that it cannot be equal to the optimal level of LSSC system, which results from LSI's moral hazard induced by hold-up problem. Therefore, only an effective incentive mechanism is designed to impel specific LC investment level to achieve the global optimization of LSSC through avoiding hold-up problem. At last, this dissertation introduces an incomplete relational contract to solve LC underinvestment problem induced by hold-up problem which cannot be solved effectively by linear incentive contract. The self-enforceability condition of the relational contract is analyzed and furthermore, the optimal relational contract designed can make LSS achieve the optimal specific LC investment level and LSSC is Pareto coordinated under the condition that the value of the discount factor is satisfied in certain range.(5)Game behavior about logistics service quality coordination between LSI and LSS is analyzed from two different perspectives. On one hand, considering a quality output owned by LSI but created jointly by the quality input of both LSI and LSS from the input-output point of logistics service quality, this dissertation designs a linear contract about quality output sharing and establishes principal-agent model to stimulate LSS's enthusiasm for quality input and thus the quality input equilibrium of LSI an LSS to reach the global optimization of LSSC. The optimal quality input level of LSI and LSS can be given to coordinate LSSC through calculating the optimal proportion of quality output sharing. In Nash game, the negative linear relationship exists between the optimal quality input of LSI and the quality output sharing coefficient of LSS and for the optimal quality input of LSS on the contrary. At the same time, the negative linear relationship exists between the quality output sharing coefficient of LSS and the risk-averse degree of LSS. The quality output sharing coefficient depends on the cost capability and output efficiency when LSI and LSS are both risk-neutral parties.On the other hand, from the aspect of quality loss caused by logistics service quality failure, the external and internal quality failure between two parties caused by the different collocations of quality prevention failure of LSS and quality check failure of LSI, are considered in the dissertation. The optimal quality prevention level of LSS and the optimal quality check level of LSI under the global optimization of LSSC can be got through analyzing different external partition coefficient and internal partition coefficient by LSI and LSS under symmetric information and asymmetric information respectively.
Keywords/Search Tags:Logistics Service Supply Chain (LSSC), Logistics Capability (LC), Supply Contracts, Coordination Mechanism, Return Contract, Options Contract, Incomplete Relational Contract, Quality Coordination
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