| The framing effect, particularly in gain/loss applications, has customarily been viewed as a robust decision-making phenomenon (Bazerman, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1987; Arkes, 1991). Recent evidence suggests, however, that the magnitude of framing effects varies widely across studies (Kuhlberger, 1997) and that the framing phenomenon is subject to problem effects—different problems elicit different levels of the framing effect (Fagley & Miller, 1990; Schneider, 1992; Frisch, 1993; Kuhlberger, 1995; Jou, Shanteau, and Harris, 1996, etc.). It is argued here that this pattern of results may occur due to differences in individuals' elaborations regarding the framing problem, which, in turn, may cause them to reframe the problem, rendering them immune to the framing effect. Two studies were conducted to examine this proposition. In Study 1, problem effects were evident; however, when framing effects were observed, these effects exclusively occurred in low elaboration conditions or among subjects with low Need for Cognition. Following up on Study 1, Study 2 examined the possible role of elaboration levels and personal relevance on 5 commonly researched framing scenarios. It was observed that while personal relevance was an accurate predictor of preference reversals in within-subjects administrations of framing problems, elaboration was not. Perhaps more importantly, however, it was also observed that intra-individual preference reversals were actually somewhat uncommon while choice consistency was the majority preference across each of five scenarios. |
