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The political economy of agricultural policy in Brazil: Interest groups and the pattern of protection

Posted on:1995-12-07Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:University of California, BerkeleyCandidate:Helfand, Steven MFull Text:PDF
GTID:1469390014489110Subject:History
Abstract/Summary:
This dissertation examines the causes for the pattern of protection across products in Brazilian agriculture from 1964 to 1991. Four key determinants of policy are explored: interest group pressure, government objectives, economic crisis, and change in political regime.; Econometric results suggest that the pattern of nominal protection depended on government efforts to raise tax revenues, generate foreign exchange, and control inflation. Interest group characteristics associated with lowering the costs of generating political pressure and increasing the returns per member also influenced the protection rates. Smaller groups that were geographically concentrated and composed of large producers were more successful in influencing policy.; Analysis of support price policy revealed a fixed hierarchy among products regarding the level of support prices, with most of the differences justifiable on technical grounds. Annual adjustments exhibited considerable similarity across products and were highly correlated with the real exchange rate. The margin in which lobbies could have operated is contained within the unexplained 10-25% of the yearly adjustments.; Credit subsidies are estimated at over 1.8 billion 1992 dollars per year (1969-1990). Tradables benefited more than non-tradables, and wheat and soybeans captured significantly more than if the subsidies had been allocated according to each product's share in the value of production. Inequality in allocation is shown to derive, in part, from the government's agenda to generate foreign exchange and stimulate food production, and from the influence of large producers of favored commodities.; Based on fifty interviews with politicians and interest group leaders, the final chapter explores the history, institutions, and politics of agricultural policy formulation. While the economic crisis of the 1980s caused policy to be redesigned, the change in political regime and in the institutions of interest group representation influenced the process. Democratization led to the questioning of corporatism and the emergence of more participatory organizations. The return to a democratic regime led to a greater role for the Congress and Judiciary. These changes have caused policy making to become more subject to explicit rules, which should lead to more predictable policies and a long-term reduction in direct taxation of Brazilian agriculture.
Keywords/Search Tags:Policy, Pattern, Protection, Interest, Political
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