Management or closed-loop supply chains for recoverable products

This dissertation presents an interdisciplinary approach to some of the important managerial and theoretical questions of managing closed-loop supply chains for recoverable products. The methodology used in the dissertation comprises primarily analytical game theoretic modeling of incentive structures in closed-loop supply chains. The first two chapters of the dissertation deal with reverse channel design and coordination issues. The main research themes are. What is the optimal reverse channel structure from the points of view of the manufacturer, the retailer and the consumer? How can the reverse channel be used for coordinating decisions in the forward channel? Two market structures are examined: a bilateral monopoly channel structure and the competitive retailing environment. With regards the channel design decision, the main finding of the analysis is that when the retailer has full control over the market demand then s/he is in the best position to undertake product collection activity as s/he can also impact the final demand, hence the scale of the product return market, most directly. In a competitive retail market, it shown that the manufacturer faces a trade-off between the scale economies of centralization and the strategic effect of decentralization of the product collection from the end-users.; It is also shown that the profits of the coordinated system can be attained by a two-part and a three-part tariff for the bilateral monopoly and the competitive retailing market structures respectively. The last part of the dissertation examines the incentives of the consumer to return a used product in a trade-in context. Competitive strategic effect of trade-in offers are modeled for vertically differentiated products and the role of remanufacturing in a trade-in context is examined.