International trade and technology transfer

Effective export controls on dual-use high technology are an artifact of the Cold War and cannot be sustained in the post-Cold War world. The international political-economic structure determines how states reconcile competing economic and security incentives associated with technology transfer. During bipolarity, security objectives dominate policy making because the threat is clearly defined. Economic policies align with the balance of power. In a multipolar world, threats are more ambiguous; subjective evaluations of a possible adversary's intentions become necessary and security objective no longer dominate policy. Specific economic policies reflect the structure of the market rather than the political structure of the balance of power. Because market forces are fundamentally incompatible with export controls, such controls become untenable.;The central argument receives empirical support over a range of cases. The impact of political structure is evident in the shifts in U.S. technology transfer policy between bipolarity and multipolarity. Favorable treatment of allies during bipolarity and general liberalization of controls to all destinations during multipolarity are the dominant trends. In addition, historical analysis of U.S. export controls to specific destinations such as China and the Soviet Union/Russia reveals important insights about the interplay between the global political and economic structures. Economic structure and market forces are captured by examining specific technologies. Export controls on computers reflect a highly competitive market structure while controls in the aerospace industry reflect more concentrated, nearly monopolistic structures. Empirical evidence indicates that the pace of liberalization and the extent of technology transfer depend upon market structure during multipolarity.;Finally, conventional realist thought argues that security is the principal concern of states in an anarchic international system. But this analysis revealed that the economic logic, and not the security logic, dominates during multipolarity. In an important refinement, this analysis reaffirms the importance of the realist structural variables while showing the limits of these systemic variables in determining specific policy outcomes.