Economists' interpretations and applications of Thomas S. Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions. (Volumes I and II)

This dissertation examines economists' understandings as to what comprises a Kuhnian paradigm and the functions paradigms play under Kuhn's conception of science. It surveys paradigms economists have identified in economics' mainstream, heterodoxy and subfields as well as their understandings of the functions of paradigms in economics.;The work explores economists' understandings of Kuhnian normal science, determinations as to whether economics comprises a normal science, and depictions and normative assessments of normal economic science.;The study examines economists' understandings of what comprises a Kuhnian scientific revolution and their applications of Kuhn's scientific revolution concept to economics' history.;Given the heterogeneity of Kuhn's model of science, economists' selective and multiple perceptions of Kuhn's work and economics, and the diverse, multifaceted character of economics, economists have subjected Kuhn's notions, and the field of economics to which they have applied them, to selective and multiple interpretations. They have offered multiple definitions of a Kuhnian paradigm, disagreed whether paradigms serve to hinder scientists (economists) in their work and as to the applicability of the paradigm concept in economics and provided widely varying specifications of economics' mainstream paradigm. Economists have also differed in their determinations whether a given heterodox school possesses a paradigm, identified different types of economics paradigms and located paradigms at different levels of the discipline.;Economists differ as to the elements of Kuhnian normal science they highlight, their determinations as to whether economics comprises a normal science, and their depictions and normative assessments of normal economic science.;Economists differ as to the extent and nature of the change effected by Kuhnian scientific revolutions, whether economics has ever undergone a scientific revolution, the changes they see effected by the marginal (utility), Keynesian and other putative revolutions in economics history, and in their determinations whether those changes constitute a scientific revolution.;This dissertation therefore raises questions whether there exists an objective Truth about either economics or Kuhn's work, toward which economists have or will ever converge. Indeed, it provides strong indication that any given understanding of economics or Kuhn's work is best understood as part of a larger matrix of interpretations.