WITTGENSTEIN'S DOOR TO HISTORICAL CRITICISM (LANGUAGE, POLITICS, LITERARY THEORY, REPRESENTATION, PHILOSOPHY)

My dissertation addresses two problems of literary theory: (1) the definition of literary representation, and (2) the need for an historical literary criticism. It also addresses by implication the nature and extent of literature's relation to society.;I conclude that in literary studies we must expand our definition of literature beyond the common canons to include minor or otherwise excluded writings of a culture. Also, in order to investigate comprehensively the meaning of a text, we must rid ourselves of our perception of literary studies as a separate discipline, and instead place ourselves as literary critics and teachers in a larger category of interdisciplinary studies.;In addition, Wittgenstein's arguments are a good lesson in the hidden fruitlessness of the contemporary institution of literary theory, as well as in the real historical interest of our theoretical assumptions. I argue for an end to the search for fundamental principles of literary studies, which aims for metaphysical certainty at the expense of understanding the historical sources and limits of literary writing, and of such fundamental principles.;In a related argument, I contend that the historical investigation of literature and literary theories reveals the extent to which both forms of discourse are themselves social activities with practical consequences for the formation, maintenance, or alteration of our social life. To demonstrate the cogency of this argument, I conclude with a chapter analyzing the work of Raymond Williams, who has tried in his literary criticism to reveal the active, practical character of a society's writing.;I use Wittgenstein's later language philosophy to analyze representation, because his later work is an explanatory rejection of transcendental theories of linguistic correspondence. Moreover, the connections he makes between linguistic meaning and a society's way of living afford insight into the need for historical interpretation. However, my study also reveals the points at which Wittgenstein fails to account for repression or mediation as a part of meaning. I suggest some reasons why his otherwise strong acceptance of socially engendered meanings does not, but should, include this possibility.