MEINONG AND REFERENCE

Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects is known to the Anglo-American philosophical community almost exclusively through Bertrand Russell's criticism of the theory in "On Denoting" and later works, and even though certain recent writers have urged that the interpretive tradition intitated by Russell is importantly in error, no interpretation designed to present Meinongianism as a coherent genuine alternative to the Russellian tradition in semantics has yet been offered. This study contributes to such an alternative interpretation, employing a combination of historical and philosophical arguments.;The first chapter offers a synoptic view of Russell's Theory of Descriptions. The author argues that throughout his career Russell presupposed the very semantical views he claimed to have found objectionable in Meinong, views here dubbed the Naive Theory of Meaning. The discussion falls into three broad parts: a demonstration of the presence of the Naive Theory in Russell's early Principles of Mathematics; a discussion of the persistence of the Naive Theory in "On Denoting," directed against Russell's claim that that theory was eliminated by the Theory of Descriptions; and an examination of the later entanglement of the Naive Theory with the notion of acquaintance in the writings after "On Denoting." An appendix to the chapter refutes objections and dismisses alternatives to the interpretation offered here.;The second chapter employs extended exegetical arguments to demonstrate that Meinong's Theory of Objects not only does not embody the Naive Theory of Meaning, but is grounded in an explicit and categorical rejection of that theory. It is explained that Meinong's notion of Aussersein is not, as Russell appeared to suppose, an ontological category, and an alternative is presented on which it appears as an ontologically neutral linguistic category. It is suggested, futhermore, that such an interpretation is consistent with holism and inconsistent with atomism. An appendix to the chapter refutes two carefully selected alternative interpretations of Meinong's theory.;The third chapter lays down conditions, grounded in the exegesis of the second chapter, that a view must satisfy in order to be called Meinongian. The resulting range of views is clarified and an objection concerning the consequences for quantification theory considered in detail. Though any of several responses to the objection are considered viable, it is argued that the most powerfully is one that involves mirroring as closely as possible the paradigmatic philosophical interpretation of quantification theory that derives from W. V. O. Quine. It is further argued that such mirroring results in an interpretation involving only a small departure from Quinean doctrine, namely the suspension of the classical rule of existential generalization and its replacement with an analogous rule typical of sytems of free logic, and that such an interpretation is suitable for Meinongianism. An appendix to the chapter presents a sketch of a formal model appropriate for the claims made in the body of the chapter.;The introduction aspires to set the discussion in the broader context of two general approaches to semantics: the atomistic picture of Russell among others, and the holistic picture of Quine, Wittgenstein, and Rorty, among others. The author insinuates that Meinong's views are best understood and defended against the background of a holistic approach.