'The party of humankind': Sociality and moral revision in David Hume

David Hume is one of the classic proponents of moral sentimentalism . According to this school of thought, our understanding of virtue and vice springs primarily from our capacity for feeling as opposed to reason. A standard worry about Hume's account is that it produces an overly conservative theory of morality which blindly supports the status quo. This is because, for Hume, what makes some trait a virtue (or vice) is simply that it commonly garners sentiments of approval (or disapproval). If this is the case, then even traits that are only disapproved of due to prejudice, intolerance, and misunderstanding, must be counted as genuine vices. Thus, it seems that Hume's moral theory, instead of providing a method for critiquing and revising prevailing discriminatory attitudes, would actually lend support to them.;My dissertation argues, however, that Hume's distinctive understanding of sentimentalism provides a more robust method for revising existing moral views than the above sketch would suggest. If we are in doubt about whether or not developing a praiseworthy moral character is worth the effort, Hume thinks we can renew our dedication by reflecting on the origin of our moral sentiments. Such reflection should reveal that our moral sentiments are the product of what is best about human nature. Although Hume suggests in some places that we will not find anything negative lurking in the psychological foundation of our moral sentiments, at important points he expresses an ambivalent or even disapproving attitude about traits that are commonly praised. If our commitment to virtue depends upon seeing that our moral sentiments arise from an agreeable origin, then finding that our appraisal of some trait lacked that foundation should give us a reason to revise our feelings.;Pursuing this line of thought first requires getting clear on why Hume believes we will be pleased with the origin of our moral sense. I argue that, for Hume, the reason our moral sentiments garner such approval is that they represent the social nature of human beings. This can be seen in Hume's explanation of what motivates us to make moral judgments. Hume notes that the sentiments particular to morality are only felt when we adopt a general point of view that allows us to recognize even the virtue qualities of our enemies. From this vantage point we set aside considerations of self-interest, and other aspects of our personal perspective that would render our moral evaluations idiosyncratic, and survey others in an impartial manner. One puzzling question regarding the general point of view is what motivates us to look at our peers in this specific sort of way. By setting aside the particularity of our personal vantage point, we are able to preserve our identity as the species which is united by a common set of moral sentiments. This identity, which Hume states that we "cherish," forms what he terms the "party of humankind.";Thus, from the outset the process of feeling moral sentiments is imbued with our desire to unite with our fellow human beings. Given that we find it most satisfying to consider the social aspects of our nature, Hume believes we will be pleased with the origin of our moral sentiments. Thus, we should have a reason to modify our approval of some trait when we find that approval does not represent human sociality. I support attributing this claim to Hume by looking at a specific instance where he is uneasy about the fact that some trait garners widespread approval: our approval of military heroism. Since this quality meets general approval, Hume must classify it as a virtue. However, he is uneasy about doing so and does not seem content to allow our unreflective appraisal of this trait to stand. Particularly in his later work, Hume seeks to reform our sentiments by painting a less appealing picture of military glory that emphasizes its more ruthless and inhumane aspects. Significantly, Hume does not do something similar to counteract our tendency to praise those whose excessive benevolence ultimately leads to harm. He points out that their selfless display of concern for others is so engaging that we cannot help but praise it. In each case, then, a trait garners general approval despite the fact that it causes harm. Yet, it is only in the case of our approval of the military hero, where our sentiments lack a foundation in human sociability, that Hume attempts to reform our sentiments.;Having shown that Hume aims to modify moral approvals that do not arise from the social tendencies of human nature, I turn to considering how this account could be applied to Hume's theory of justice. (Abstract shortened by UMI.).