Testifying across Difference Responsibility for Interpersonal and Structural Epistemic Injustice

This dissertation explores how interpersonal and structural prejudices give rise to defects in our epistemic practices. First, I offer amendments to Miranda Fricker's (2007) accounts of two central forms of epistemic injustice---testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. The amended accounts of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice that I offer (1) incorporate the harms of credibility excess and positive stereotypes and (2) acknowledge that dysfunctions in our hermeneutical practices occur not only within the processes through which new concepts are generated but also within the processes through which such concepts are disseminated and utilized within a broader epistemic culture. The second main aim of my dissertation is to offer a positive account of what is required to achieve epistemic justice, with specific emphasis on our epistemic obligations in transitional periods during which structural remedies are implemented.