The anticompetitive nature and political economy issues of United States antidumping law

GATT members increasingly have sought relief from imports through administered protection programs. The liberal use of antidumping law among trading partners exemplifies this increase in nontariff trade barriers. Unfortunately, the United States has not resisted this tendency. Since the passage of the Trade Agreement Act of 1979, which rewrote antidumping law effective January 1, 1980, the favorite "fair trade law" of protection-seekers in this country has been the antidumping statute. This dissertation (1) examines the reasons for the popularity of current antidumping law, (2) explores the conflict between antidumping law and antitrust law, (3) presents a theoretical discussion addressing how the unilateral adoption of antidumping law alters the domestic market structure, and (4) empirically investigates the anticompetitive aspects and political economy issues surrounding this statute.; This paper estimates empirically the market power implications for firms seeking redress under current antidumping law. The market power consequences are examined for each of the three possible resolutions of an antidumping suit: petition accepted, petition rejected, or petition withdrawn. For each of the three outcomes, an industry case study is presented and the market power test conducted. Evidence is presented supporting the belief that plaintiffs receiving protection under the antidumping statute enhance their domestic market power, while plaintiffs having their petition rejected experience a diminution in market power. The evidence is less clear for firms that withdraw their antidumping petition prior to the resolution of the case.; During the 1980s the United States filed an unprecedented number of antidumping complaints against foreign rivals. It is interesting from a political economy standpoint whether or not certain factors enhance the probability of trade officials siding with plaintiffs in an antidumping investigation. These include, but are not limited to, the criteria encoded by Congress in the Trade Agreement Act of 1979 which enumerate the factors the International Trade Commission (ITC) ought to consider in ascertaining whether or not an industry in the United States is injured by reason of "dumped" imports. A probit model is estimated to determine the significance of such factors during the period 1980-91. It is found that although the ITC considers several of the mandated criteria in its determination, other significant factors are not among the encoded injury standards.