On Non-market Economy Rules And Its Abuse In Us Antidumping Investigations Against China

The first chapter introduces the development of the antidumping law of the United States (the"US") in a historical perspective. It first briefly introduces the dumping theory and the origin of antidumping legislation. It then briefly introduces the history of US antidumping law. At the end, it introduces the current US antidumping law and relevant procedures.The second chapter introduces the origin and development of non-market economy (the"NME") rules of US antidumping law. It first introduces the rise of the problems regarding the so-called NME countries in an antidumping investigation that gave birth to the NME rules. It then introduces the development of the NME rules in US antidumping law and its new adaptations regarding the transition economies.The third chapter introduces the current NME rules in US antidumping law in details. It first introduces the definition and criteria of a NME country as well as relevant procedures. It then introduces the separate rate rules, including the separate rate test, the combination rate and the rate for non-compulsory respondents who pass the separate rate test. At the end, it introduces the calculation of normal value of the product under investigation, including selecting the surrogate country, selecting a surrogate value and other related issues.The fourth chapter discusses the abuse of NME rules in the US antidumping investigations against China. First, it analyzes the overall impact on the Chinese enterprises by the abuse of NME rules via comparing various sources of data. It then discusses specific abuse practices in details with data analysis and examples. When discussing specific abuse practices by US Department of Commerce (the"DOC"), it first analyzes the reasons why DOC refused to recognize the market economy status of China and predicts that the DOC will not recognize the status in advance. It then discusses the DOC's abuse by misapplying the market-oriented industry test and granting no Chinese industry market oriented status and its recent modification of the separate rate test to increase the difficulties for Chinese enterprises to gain separate rates. At the end, it discusses DOC's abuse practices in selecting surrogate values for factors of production and takes certain Chinese enterprise responding the US antidumping investigation against PSF from China for an example.The last chapter discusses the strategies against the abuse of NME rules in US antidumping investigations against China. The first strategy is that Chinese government should change its traditional minds and bring the abuse of NME rules in US antidumping investigations against China to the dispute settlement understanding of the WTO in order to bring an end to the NME rules. The chapter then discusses the possibility that Chinese enterprises may break through the blockage of the NME rules thoroughly by building a potential and advantageous surrogate country for themselves by foreign direct investment.