| The political struggles over oil policy in the 1950s were contests between narrow economic interest groups to collect economic rents, as would be expected if government is considered to be just another forum for rent seeking behavior, with government intervention accepted as a norm. Conversely, the attempt to obtain decontrol of natural gas production during this period, during which consumer interests and pro-market ideology were important factors, presaged the oil politics of the 1970s. The significant impact of consumer interests on oil policy contradicts the expectations of public choice theorists that consumers will be disadvantaged in contests with well organized and wealthy interest groups. The ability of latent interest groups to influence policy when represented by politicians and private actors acting as political entrepreneurs was demonstrated during the 1970s as they dominated oil politics. Substantial economic rents, generated by the OPEC price increases, were transferred to consumers and refiners, while tax breaks were eliminated despite the economic resources available to producers. The pattern of distribution of those economic rents, as well as various tax breaks and exemptions from controls, was skewed toward small producers and refiners, reflecting a traditional ideological prejudice against big business. Econometric analysis revealed that ideology, party and oil production by constituents were the most important influences on congressional voting. |
