Power and the emergence of rule in international relation

A theory is proposed that explains how rule emerges among independent rational actors. Most international relations theory assumes that anarchy is the defining characteristic of the international system. Anarchy, however, is an ideal rather than an empirical reality. This is especially true if anarchy is conceptualized as the absence of rule rather than the absence of government. Where anarchy implies uncertainty, rule implies order.;An axiomatic theory is presented that shows that in an infinitely iterated sequential game, there is an inevitable tendency for rational actors to create rules and for conditions of rule to emerge.;A field theoretic conception of power is developed to define rules and conditions of rule. A rational actor will use power to change the utility calculus of its opponent in order to persuade the opponent to perform actions that the actor desires. An actor can affect the opponent's choice of action by changing the opponent's subjective probability of the actor's response, by changing the opponent's utility gained from various outcomes, or by changing the set of actions that are available to the opponent. Rule results from rational actors using these power mechanisms to reduce the uncertainty in their environment.;Hypotheses derived from the theory of rule are tested by simulating games that are commonly used to model international relations. The tests show that conflictual games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Chicken game produce cooperative outcomes if the players are sufficiently interested in future benefits and if the opponent's subjective probability of the actor's response is skewed toward a rule condition.;Two empirical cases are examined to illustrate the emergence of rule in real world settings. These two cases are the development of the Rules of the Road at Sea and the shift away from the gold standard between the two world wars.