ROSCOE POUND'S JURISPRUDENCE: INTEREST THEORY IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

The dissertation considers Pound's philosophy of law in the context of the social and legal issues of the early 20th century and in the context of the historical transformation of interest theory as a philosophy of human nature and of law.;The adoption of Pound's "balance-of-interest" theory of judicial decision by American courts is critically reviewed especially with respect to its negative impact on civil rights and on legality generally. Pound is cited for failing to enhance the authority of objective sources of law (Constitutions, statutes, codes) and for his promotion of judicial subjectivity, judicial "freedom" and judicial case-to-case pragmatic "equity." It is noted that Pound's eclecticism results in a rending of his philosophy into incompatible neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian elements.;Consideration is given to Pound's relation to the 20th century American juridical movement known as "legal realism." The reliance of Ronald Dworkin on Pound is discussed in some detail. Dworkin and H. L. A. Hart are viewed as foundering like Pound on the attempt to reconcile the traditional law-making power of the common-law judge with the ideal of pre-established, authoritative, democratically-promulgated laws.;Philosophies of interest are followed from their origins in the French enlightenment as mechanical, individualist, materialist theory (Helvetius), through their alteration under English utilitarianism (Bentham), and their issue as a theory of teleologized "social interests" in 19th century German idealism (Von Jhering). Pound's debt to all of the foregoing is established, as is the close connection between Pound and his contemporaries William James, R. B. Perry and John Dewey. The Poundian-pragmatic version of interest philosophy is criticized as an unwarranted abstraction, idealization and formalization of social reality, failing to attain the "concrete," "human" standpoint desired.