Difficult choices: Autonomy and the liberal state

This project concerns a deeply contested moral ideal: autonomy. To be autonomous is to have authority over one's self and to govern one's life on the basis of value commitments one deems important. One of the dominant views of liberalism -- antiperfectionist comprehensive liberalism -- distinguishes itself from other liberal views because it grants unique privilege to the ideal of autonomy in personal and political life. Will Kymlicka is one of the most prominent defenders of antiperfectionist comprehensive liberalism and while he appeals to the ideal of autonomy in his liberalism, he is not clear about which theory of autonomy he is appealing to. As a result, his theory of autonomy is sketchy and incomplete. As an autonomy theorist, I think that there is more Kymlicka can say to elaborate on the view of autonomy operating in his theory of liberalism. Kymlicka has not explained whether his view is a procedural, or substantive, or a socio-relational view and these exhaust the kinds of views of autonomy in the literature, so Kymlicka's view must be one of these. It is important for Kymlicka to be clear on the view of autonomy he incorporates because each theory has its own motivating assumptions and standards for what counts as an autonomous choice. In addition, it is important for Kymlicka to be clear about the theory of autonomy in his liberalism, because, in some cases, the standards for autonomy may be inconsistent with his liberal commitments. In this project, I argue that Kymlicka incorporates a socio-relational view of autonomy in his liberalism.