| My dissertation consists of three distinct essays in industrial economics. The first essay studies the timing of research partnerships under uncertainty. Using a game theoretic duopoly framework, I demonstrate that delay in the formation of cooperative research ventures can be optimal when firms face uncertainty concerning each other's ability to do research. Delay allows firms to learn about each other, as well as to signal their own ability. A firm may also choose delay as a strategic device in an attempt to achieve the discovery alone, without sharing the results. I explore the relationship between the two available signals: RJV membership and the level of research effort, and show that they might be incompatible.; The second paper analyzes the effects of a policy of disclosure with delay on the speed of discovery and incentives to invest in a multi-stage patent race. Depending on the parameters, four equilibrium configurations are obtained. In the firstly, a single firm acts as a monopolist. In the second, a single firm invests at the initial stages, but the second firm joins in the race after the disclosure of the intermediate product. In the third, both firms invest when they have equal knowledge, but only the leader invests before the disclosure of the intermediate product. In the last configuration, firms always compete, except when the disclosure date is close. The determination of the optimal disclosure delay involves a tradeoff between the incentives to invest and the expected time of discovery of the final product.; In the third essay, I develop a multi-dimensional characteristics based model of product differentiation. Consumers' tastes are distributed over a vector of utility parameters, in particular, income or wealth and relative preference for the various characteristics. Firms make decisions in a two-stage game. In the first stage, they choose the indivisible basket of characteristics that will define their respective products. Prices are chosen in the second stage. Equilibrium, possibly in mixed strategies, is shown to exist in the pricing stage. Through simulations, I find that the equilibria of the game are asymmetric even when the firms are identical. |
