Institutions, engineering infrastructure, and performance in the governance and management of irrigation systems: The case of Nepa

This study addresses the question of how institutions, together with various physical and socio-economic attributes, affect the performance of irrigation systems in Nepal. In particular, it focuses on how (1) two types of governance structures (farmer-managed versus agency-managed) affect individuals' incentives and capabilities to cope with collective-action problems involved in system operation and maintenance, and (2) diverse combinations of institutions and engineering infrastructures affect irrigation governance, management, and performance.;Drawing upon a theory of institutions developed in a rational-choice tradition, I lay out conditions under which individuals are more likely to contribute their efforts to collective action and the way that institutions pertain to these conditions. Based upon the theoretical discussion, I examine the incentive structures faced by irrigation officials as well as farmers in irrigation systems in Nepal. Evidence from 150 irrigation systems in Nepal is used to examine the arguments about how various institutional, physical, and socio-economic attributes affect irrigation performance.;Physical and socio-economic attributes including the availability of alternative water sources and the presence of socio-economic differences among farmers affect farmers' incentives to engage in collective action. In particular, the presence of sophisticated engineering infrastructure such as permanent headworks may exacerbate the asymmetries of interests and endowment between farmers located at the head end and those at the tail end of a system. If such asymmetries are not offset by an active governance regime, headenders tend to exploit their comparative advantages to the expense of tailenders.;Farmer-managed irrigation systems are more likely to be associated with productive working relationships such as a high degree of mutual trust, active participation in the crafting and monitoring of rules, and a high level of rule conformance. These relationships are the basis upon which high levels of performance are attained. Agency-managed irrigation systems, on the other hand, are organized upon a dominance-dependence relationship between irrigation officials and farmers. Such a relationship yields little incentives for either officials or farmers to contribute their efforts to irrigation operation and maintenance.