Corporate governance and risk taking

This dissertation examines the effect of various corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk taking. The first essay examines the effect on firm risk through the CEO ability channel, while the second essay examines the effect on firm risk through the institutional investor channel.;This first essay investigates CEO risk management ability. Using CEO education as a proxy for ability I examine the relationship between CEO education and various types of risk: (1) market risk, (2) credit risk, and (3) operational risk. Propensity score methods are used as a way to deal with the endogenous matching problem which exists in the executive compensation literature. These methods are proposed as an alternative to the managerial fixed effects approaches such as ``spell fixed effects'' and the mover dummy variable method (MDV). While the managerial fixed effects methods would fail when the explanatory variables of interest are time-invariant, it is possible to capture this variation in managerial effects by using propensity score methods. I find that the effect on the various types of risks varies by the type of risk and by the type and quality of education. Firms with CEOs that have law degrees and actuarial credentials are associated with fewer operational risk events. While firms with CEOs that have MBA degrees are able to manage market risk better than their peers. Overall, the quality of CEO education matters, and in many cases it is associated with a simultaneous reduction in firm risk and increase in firm value.;This second essay investigates the impact of institutional shareholder ownership on firm risk taking. I find a negative relationship between the aggregate institutional ownership percentage and firm risk taking. I also find that institutional ownership concentration induces risk taking. In addition, the effect on firm risk is stronger when institutional shareholders have majority control. The results provide support for both the prudent-man law and the large institutional shareholder hypotheses. Furthermore, the results are robust to quasi-experimental approaches including propensity score matching and doubly robust estimation. These findings provide additional evidence on the benefits and incentives of institutional shareholder monitoring.