The Design Of International Institutions Under The Regime Complex

Why does the newly created institutions(or regime shifting)in a specific issue area follow the rules and design of the existing one? With the proliferation of international institutions,there is a “regime complex” which refers to partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions in a particular issue area.Existing work argues actors create competitive alternatives or regime shifting to challenge existing rules,norms and practices under conditions of dissatisfaction with existing institutions,and pursue goals different from existing institutions.This perspective exaggerates inter-institutional competition.This paper develops a theory to account for why newly created(regime shifting)institutions follow the rules and design of the existing one?The main observation indicators include institutional rules,membership and decisionmaking system.In an issue area,existing arrangements will channel and constrain the process of creating new rules.This article assumes that actors are bound rationality and loss aversion.On the one hand,they face uncertainties in decision-making process,and they will choose satisfied results rather than optimal results.On the other hand,they are more concerned about loss of performance than future gains and will risk avoiding losses.Existing institutional flexibility and institutional competition in the issue area have contributed to the continuation of institutional design between the new and the old institutions.Institutional flexibility refers to the institutional guiding expectations to what extant can be subjected to interpretation,debate and contestation.Institutional competition refers to a form of newly created institution or regime shifting that is initiated by the state to change the status quo of the existing institutions and that conflicts with the existing institutions in terms of institutional rules and practices.This article proposes three hypotheses: the more flexible the existing institutions,the more likely the new institution will follow the existing rules,otherwise,the new institution is more likely to propose new rules and have new designing features.When the existing institutions is highly flexible and the degree of institutional competition is high in the issue area,the high possibility of new institutions to propose new rules;When the existing institution is highly flexible and the degree of institutional competition is low in the issue area,the newly-created or regime shifting will follow the existing rules.The flexibility of the existing institutions determines the interpretability and inclusiveness of the institutional rules,as well as whether it can accommodate the preferences of actors who dissatisfied with the status quo;the degree of competition between institutions affects the cost of competition for the “latecomers” of the system.In the field of international development financing,the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,initiated by China,has accepted the main institutional rules of the World Bank,and its membership and decision-making mechanisms are similar to those of the World Bank.On the one hand,the World Bank rules are flexible which can be interpreted and applied by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in the field of infrastructure investment.Although the World Bank does not set flexibility clauses,its professional authority ensures a certain degree of neutrality in the policy rules.On the other hand,the degree of institutional competition in this issue area is low.The World Bank is the focal organization and enjoys high authority,which is not conducive to the development of new institutional rules.On the contrary,establishing formal links with the World Bank helps the AIIB to gain international recognition,making it a truly global international organization.Trade-related intellectual property agreements is an important international regimes in the field of intellectual property rights,which have raised international intellectual property protection standards.However,strict rules have also caused dissatisfaction with drug-related patent protection rules in developing countries.The issue of intellectual property protection has been put on the agenda of the World Health Organization through regime shifting,but the World Health Organization is still operating within the TRIPs rule system.This article finds that TRIPs set up flexibility clauses,and under the pressure of developing countries and non-governmental organizations,the flexibility of TRIPs rules has been further improved.Developing countries can interpret and use these clauses as needed to guarantee access to medicines.Although there are many partially overlapping mechanisms in the field of intellectual property protection,due to the wide range of issues,the emerging mechanisms cannot challenge the priority of TRIPs,and TRIPs have material resources to ensure that their rules are not challenged.For developing countries,within the existing institutional system,corresponding economic benefits and further bargaining power can be obtained.Based on theoretical analysis and empirical verification,this article believes that in the issue area,the relationship between the actors’ newly created or shifted institutions and the existing one may also have coordination in the system design process and results,which will help both institutions avoid rule conflicts and produce professional division of labor.As a "latecomer" in the current international institutional field,China is promoting institutional reform and development in a highly institutionalized environment.It needs to recognize the status quo,and promote a stable and gradual change of the international system through institutional adaptation within and between institutions in order to avoid fierce conflicts and confrontations with the existing international order.