A Study Of The Policy And Role Of The United States Towards German Unification

This dissertation studies the policy of America to German unification in 1990.Presuming that German unification was determined by internal political and economic factors as well as national feelings of the German people,this paper explores the role of America in the external process of German unification by analyzing the questions of united Germany’s alliance alignment,the restoration of its sovereignty and the termination of the four victors’ rights to Germany.As leader of the west camp in Cold War,America viewed German division and unification as a useful way to manage the transatlantic alliance from the perspective of its own national interests and alliance’s strategy.America’s endorsement of German unification in 1990 war a reward to Germany for its adherence to transatlantic alliance after WWII,to be specific for its thoroughgoing democratic overhaul and its firm confrontation against Soviet Union,and served as a means to sustain American influence on and NATO’s existence in Europe in post-Cold-War times.By stabilizing Soviet-American relations,supporting Federal Republic of Germany and influencing French and Britain,America advanced the external process of German unification and played a decisive role in the quick realization of the unification,the restoration of Germany’s sovereignty and the retention of its membership of NATO.The introduction points out the topic’s significance for understanding American-German relations,the transatlantic relations and the end of Cold War.The first chapter examines the meaning of “German question” in international politics and how America divided Germany after WWII.The second chapter reviews the post-WWII American administrations’ attitudes towards German unification,which can be concluded as oral support in principle and pragmatism in essence.The third to fifth chapters analyse Bush administration’s decision and act surrounding German unification from 1989 to 1990 and the international impact of German unification,the latter of which serves to assess the effect of American policy.The third chapter deals with Bush administration’s “wait and see policy” and “escort policy” in 1989,when Cold War appeared to dissolve from the beginning of that year.In this period America encouraged the leader of FRG to carry the flag of unification and ensured the“ten points ” initiated by Kohl in pursuit of unification would not sail astray from the transatlantic alliance and be accepted in international community.The fourth chapter introduces Bush’s “push policy” at the beginning of 1990 and “cooperation policy”during the international negotiation on German unification.America initiated the “2+4”framework for the negotiation and generated NATO’s strategic transformation to accommodate Soviet security concerns,which contributed to the breakthrough of Soviet-German negotiations.The fifth chapter expounds the impact of German unification on American-German relations,NATO development,European integration and American-European relations,and concludes that America’s expectancy was only partly fulfilled.The sixth charpter is the conclusion and interprets German unification with IR theories.