Research On Management Issues Of Modern Biotechnology Research And Development Network

As a forward position emerging technology, modern biotechnology is leading edge in the frontier science, and the importance is undoubted. As the R&D cycle of modern biotechnology is long, the stage of the decision-making is much, the investment is huge and the success rate is low, all of which make it complex to the R&D process and management for the modern biotechnology, but companies will receive enormous returns if they are successful acepted by the market. The high investment and the high risky give the researcher not only unprecedented challenge but also the infinite opportunity at the same time. The research group include biotech enterprise, pharmacy firms, universities and venture investment corporations cooperating and competing with each other, which form a huge researching networks organization. Research networks can be divided into four function parts: the entity enterprises which are mainly formed by the modern biotech enterprise and pharmacy firms, the research organization composed of university, the researching corporations, the capital organization which composes of venture investment corporations and agency including government and industrial union. The competition pattern between them is changing constantly, and the type of new cooperation model developes continueously. Because the relation between cooperation and competion is dynamically changing, it is important for each group to know about the envolving time of the researching networks in decision-making. This paper starts from the reciprocity between unit entities in R&D networks to analyze, building corresponding model, and expatiates on the rationality by practical case.This paper is starting from reviewing the evolution of R&D network of modern biotechnology, then study the boundary on R&D outsourcing, Real Options, and the role of the government based on the theories including Game Theory, Technological Innovation Theory, Evolutionary Economics, Real Options Theory, Knowledge Management Theory, Dynamical Networks and Graph Theory, synthesizing the following method as document study, theoretical analysis, case analysis, probability statistic analysis and system modeling, finally operating the case analysis along with sampling data and case.First, we considered the R&D network dynamical evolution model based on the cooperation and competion interaction relationship between the constitution of some typical modern biotechnology R&D networks The innovation power by knowledge accumulation in the R&D process actes as fundamental function, and this paper set up the R&D network knowledge accumulation modeling by the character of knowledge complementary. And this model is proved by the analysis of practical case. They are instructive for the strategic policy theoretically and practically not only for the modern biotechnology R&D enterprise, but also for the university, government, and the risk investment corporation.Second, from the heterogeneity of the technology uncertainty between modern biotechnology enterprise and pharmaceutical firm and the capital obtaining of them to analysize each investment strategy of modern biotechnology enterprises and pharmaceutical firms, setting up the technology uncertainty measurement model and investment options model, and uncover the real reason why the modern biotechnology enterprise is engaged in the R&D in biotechnology before pharmaceutical firm. And we find that the pharmaceutical firms are always devoted partly not wholly into solving the technology uncertainty in order to puesue the maxium R&D opportunity value; the modern biotechnology enterprise choice to invest immediately. The two kind of the enterprise enjoy the profits in the investment process. The modern biotechnology enterprises sell the profession knowledge to the pharmaceutical firms to take back part R&D cost to kill risky. pharmaceutical firms reduce the R&D technology uncertainty by keeping the option investment and paying smaller cost to the innovating enterprise.when the condition is fit the pharmaceutical firms exercise option to invest to get profession knowledge. These discovery have two importances, firstly is that the modern biotechnology enterprise reduce the R&D sunk cost, secondly is pharmaceutical firms can observe the technology uncertainty evaluation without wholly invest.Third, this paper presented a R&D outsourcing selection model in the process innovation by Principal-Agency Mechanism, and analyze the border between outsourcing and internal R&D with Game Theory, and also the border between outsourcing in information without leak and the one in information with leak, this research can propose a solution of R&D outsourcing for enterprise. We find that if the agency profits slightly from the client loss by information leak, the agency will select the outsourcing method, when the outsourcing contract employ the payment by revenue sharing instead of lump-sum payment, the client will pay the agency emolument, the agency can profit more as revenue sharing by contrast than lump-sum payment.Lastly, this paper analyzed the government leading and server role respectively in the innovation process on the principal-agent theory, and get the optimal innovation level and optimal server level, and expand to analyze the reputation incentive effect in two situation, with effects of the government optimal innovation level and optimal server level to the alliance of government, enterprises, universities and research institutes and reputation incentive. From the server of the government for the enterprises, universities and research institutes, the government server incentive mechanisms in the alliance of government, enterprises, universities and research institutes on the Principal-Agent Theory, and analyze the optimal government server, we found the following illumination: enterprises, universities and research institutes receive the government server actively, and the enterprises, universities and research institutes and the government conform leasing system(or contract system), that is the enterprises, universities and research institutes pay fixed rent; and the higher retained earnings and the cost coefficient of the government server, the more rent should be payed; the more effect coefficient of the bulk effect from the government server, the less rent payed. We also find that the enterprises, universities and research institutes is necessary for the reputation incentive by the government, the material encouragement has the same effect with reputation incentive, which can make the government choice the better server, and good for the trust to the government at the same time. This paper analyzed the leading role and server role of the government by principal-agent theory.