| In China, more than two decades' development of stock market has witnessed an increasing listed companies whose market value have been aggregating along with excessively. Emerging from the fast development, unceasing irregularities of listed companies has not only brought huge loss to investors, hold back the stock market's function to allocate efficiently market resources but also frustrate the relative regulatory authorities, which altogether brought irregularities of listed companies into the spotlight. Confronting such a big problem, scholars have dived into the irregularities of listed companies from different aspects, adopting varied date and methods, hoping to find out the fundamental cause. In order to restrict irregular market behaviors, market regulatory authorities, as an indispensible participator, on the one hand have resorted to laws.On the other hand, they have been calling for a tighter supervision from relevant parts (including mass media, investors) to listed companies and merciless punishment should be given to those who are found guilty so as to decrease the irregularity rate by increasing their irregularity cost.True as it is that the regulatory authorities have racked their brain to prevent irregularity from happening, irregularities of listed company in China have not been effectively stopped. It is even safe to say that irregularities will be increasing year by year in a quite long period of time, which can be proved that in2001irregularities increased to10%. Since then, though irregularity rate in China did decreased somehow, it kept to be higher than that in the developed countries in Europe and America. Meanwhile, shareholder irregularity in Chinese listed companies has grown out of nothing and it tends to grow year by year. Those real and complicated situations have pushed us to think what is the cause, lack of supervision, fragmented company management or other uncovered cause?Narrowing down to the20-year databases of both Shanghai A share market and Shenzhen A share market, referring to related theories and adopting empirical research on both Panel data and Cross section data.First of all, it starts from ultimate controlling shareholder to find out the influence of ultimate ownership and separation degree upon irregularity and importance is attached to the respective of influence of ultimate ownership and separation degree upon management irregularities and shareholder irregularities when ultimate control and ultimate ownership are and aren't separated. This could not only empirically test the first and second type of principal-agent, but also could provide valuable reference for policy making. Secondly, the management mechanism usually with a board of directors as the heart of a company has been used as an important tool to solve or relive agent problems and researches used to focus on how its variables influence the irregularities. But from the existed researches, it is noticed that a sound study of organization management and irregularities is wanted. Not only analyzing how the-board-of-directors-oriented management mechanism influences irregularity, this dissertation but also examines indirectly its stability in a multi-modeled environment to further text the conclusion derived from research. Furthermore, as the geographic variable, system environment will do well to organization management, but no sound analysis of system environment's influence upon irregularities could be found in the existing research paper. And few if any documents have made enough research to the influence of environmental variables upon irregularities.Using empirical method, this dissertation has made research on the following levels in order:posing problem, reviewing research background, analyzing research theory and assumption, measuring and analyzing results, concluding research. Part one, Introduction, clearly poses and states the problem concerned in this dissertation, as well as lists the research structure. Part two focuses on reviewing documents on ultimate controlling shareholder, ultimate ownership, separation degree, the-board-of-directors-oriented management mechanism, systematic environment as well as irregularities, and further sorting up and commentating the existing research results for a solid theoretical base. Part three is mainly concerned with reviewing the research background by listing the bad irregularities and the punishments going to them with a detailed chart used to demonstrate the irregularity rate, the irregularity type and the change trend and status of irregularity subjects. In addition, it also spares space for a detailed description of history of supervision systems of stock in China and a minute sorting up of the change and improvement of the management mechanism of Chinese listed companies. Part five focuses on research design. In this part, the source of date concerned and the way of access are elaborated; every variables defined and measured, and all measuring models concerned clarified. Part six is titled as measured result and its analysis. It starts from analyzing descriptively all variables of ultimate controlling shareholder, ultimate ownership, separation degree, the-board-of-directors-oriented management mechanism as well as systematic environment, and then it follows up the analyzing of interrelationship between irregularities and ultimate controlling shareholder, ultimate ownership, separation degree, the-board-of-directors-oriented management mechanism, systematic environment; but more research space has been given to the following three aspects:the relationship among ultimate ownership, separation degree, irregularities on management level as well as shareholders, the analysis of modeling results and the testing of research assumption raised in this dissertation. And Part seven is to conclude this dissertation mainly including the research result and its policy significance, the limit of this research and the direction for further research. Based on the study above, it comes to the following conclusion:(1)Though ultimate controlling shareholder ownership and separation degree are helpful in restraining irregularity, the rare of ultimate ownership is more efficient and effective in evidence but with ultimate controlling shareholder having no obvious affect upon irregularity. Meanwhile, the nature of business is a key to influence organization management, as the ownership rate of ultimate controlling shareholder ownership and separation degree are negatively or slightly concerned with irregularity in rivalry businesses as well as in administrative monopoly industry respectively.(2)The separation of ultimate control and ultimate ownership has obviously weakened the influence of the rate of ultimate controlling shareholder ownership upon the management irregularity of listed companies. Both the control of ultimate controlling shareholder and the separation degree of ultimate ownership are positively related to shareholder irregularity rate on which, however, the rate of ultimate controlling shareholder ownership has no evident influence.(3)Among the variables of organization management, the share rate of the first major shareholder can be suppressive to irregularity while that of the rest of the-board-oriented management mechanism has not played its due role and has nothing to do with irregularity.(4)The systematical environment in which the organization operates is keenly effective to suppress irregularity. To be more specific, the higher economy develops influence irregularity.(5)Further analysis has found that the excessively high rate of controlling shareholder of state-owned listed companies has severely hindered the full play of the organization's function.Starting from irregularities of listed companies and based on relevant theories on organization management, this dissertation has made the following contributions to related fields:(1) The research firm irregularities By starting from ultimate controlling shareholder.(2)Against the subjects, an irregularities has been classified into management irregularity and shareholder irregularity so as to study their relationships between ultimate controlling shareholder ownership and separation degree. And this allows us the most direct and favorable access to study another two important aspects concerned:one is the first agent problem between the ultimate controlling shareholder and the management, the other is the second agent problem between the ultimate controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. Reviewing the existing documents, it turns out that none has brought this two agent problems into one paper to study.(3)Through elaborated work, this dissertation has also dug out the fundamental cause that baffled the building-up and the function of the management mechanism, which can provide brand new solution to the management problems of Chinese listed companies.Though the author worked hard enough, there are still ceilings to be break:(1)It planed to cover all irregularities from the found of Chinese stock market to2013but failed because it's usually a long process from finding out to punishment and to final punishment report, which unavoidably brings postpone. Therefore, the latest data of irregularity we could get is only updated to2011, which failed us to have a clearer overview of the recent years since then.(2)During the research, considering the relation between data collection and sample size, we did not do individual study to those twice-reported irregularity companies in a yea, neither to its relationship to those once-reported companies.(3)Date collecting turned to be not easy at all for the earliest available management date started only from2000, ultimate controlling shareholder ownership and separation degree2003; and the date of marketization index only updated to2009which only allowed us7years (2003-2009) of panel data. If enough samples were given, this research would be more persuasive. |
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