| Under the background of China's system,such as "political centralization,economic decentralization",M-Form Hierarchy Structures,and the reform of state-owned assets management system and state-owned enterprises,from the perspective of politics legitimacy and based on the logical framework of political economics,this article has studied the effect of"Stabilizing Economic Growth"(SEG)political performance constraint and the intergovernmental fiscal decentralization on the local state-owned enterprises' investment efficiency,corporate performance and enterprise value,in the framework of "political centralization,economic decentralization"The main research contents include:Firstly,this article researched the formation mechanism and transmission mechanism of "SEG" political performance constraint,the internal logical relationship between "SEG" political performance constraint and reform of economic decentralization,and confirmed that the proposition of "SEG" political performance constraint Secondly,this article elucidated the logical implication of the "SEG" political performance constraint and intergovernmental fiscal decentralization affecting the local state-owned enterprises'investment efficiency,as well as the state-owned property's regulating effect on this influence mechanism.Thirdly,in the logical framework of "SEG" political performance constraint and fiscal decentralization,researched the influence of "SEG" political performance constraint and fiscal decentralization on the local state-owned enterprises' economic consequences(including corporate performance and enterprise value)leaded by "SEG"investment behavior.Lastly,in the logical framework of "SEG" political performance constraint and fiscal decentralization,extendedly researched the influences of monopoly degree of enterprises,number of enterprises and nature structure of enterprises in one area on the local state-owned enterprises' investment efficiencyOn the basis of literature review and logical argumentation,this paper putted forward research hypothesis and established econometric model,with these local state-owned enterprises as the main object of study that listed on the A shares in Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2003-2012 years,used ordinary least squares(OLS)in the process of the panel data regression analysis and the robustness test,and confirmed these research hypothesisThis study found that:Firstly,under the background that the political promotion tournament incentive mode places GDP at its core,local governments intervened the investment of local state-owned enterprises for political effectiveness,which leaded the local state-owned enterprises to become the government's "SEG" policy tools.The greater "SEG" political performance constraint was in one area,the more serious over-investment of local state-owned enterprises was.The mechanism of Fiscal competition between local governments that formed by Chinese style reform of fiscal decentralization,promoted the efficiency of resource allocation and economic growth,and hardened the budget constraint of local governments and local state-owned enterprises,so as to relieved the effect of "SEG" political performance constraint on the state-owned enterprises' investment.The higher degree of fiscal decentralization was in one area,the less investment efficiency loss that caused by "SEG" political performance constraint wasSecondly,the competition of political tournament prompted the local governments(the controlling shareholders of the local state-owned enterprises)and the executives of local state-owned enterprises(the inside agents of controlling shareholders)to utilize the local state-owned enterprises as tools,to grab the political private benefits of control such as"economic growth" and "political promotion".The larger proportion of state-owned property was in one local state-owned enterprise,the more serious over-investment that leaded by "SEG"political performance constraint wasThirdly,the "SEG" political burden damaged corporate performance.The greater state-owned control was in one local state-owned enterprise,the more damage of firm performance that caused by "SEG" investment behavior was.However,due to the soft budget constraint of local state-owned enterprise generated by intervention of "government subsidies",the positive effect of fiscal subsidies acquisition exists,which caused by "SEG" investment behavior.The greater "SEG" political performance constraint was in one area,the more performance that local state-owned enterprises could improve through "SEG" investment behavior was.Fiscal decentralization hardened local governments and local state-owned enterprises' soft budget constraint.The higher degree of fiscal decentralization was in one area,the lower level of local state-owned enterprises' performance improved by "SEG" investment behavior was.Fourthly,the "SEG" investment behavior brought down enterprise value.The greater "SEG"political performance constraint was in one area,the more enterprise value was damaged by over-investment.Fiscal decentralization improved the efficiency of resource allocation,hardened the budget constraint of local governments and local state-owned enterprises through the fiscal competition mechanism,accordingly alleviated the effect of "SEG" investment behavior on the enterprises value.The higher degree of fiscal decentralization was in one area,the smaller enterprise value brought down by over-investment caused by "SEG" political performance constraint was.Lastly,in the logical framework of "SEG" political performance constraint and fiscal decentralization,the higher degree of local state-owned enterprises' monopoly was,the lower enterprise investment efficiency was.There is political achievement tournament competition among the local state-owned enterprise executives(quasi officers).The larger quantity of large and medium-sized enterprise was,the higher investment efficiency of local state-owned enterprises was.The larger quantity of state-owned enterprises was,the lower investment efficiency of local state-owned enterprises was.The higher proportion of state-owned enterprises in the nature of the enterprise in one area,the lower investment efficiency of local state-owned enterprises was.These results show that:The proposition of political legitimacy and political effectiveness,and political promotion tournament incentive mode among local governments and local state-owned enterprise executives,had led to that local state-owned enterprises became local governments' public policy "SEG" tool.That is the political root of local state-owned enterprises'inefficient development strategy“scale of investment oriented".The reform of fiscal decentralization promoted process of marketization and growth of local economy,and hardened the budget constraint of local governments and local state-owned enterprises,thus that improved the efficiency of local state-owned assets allocation,and effectively alleviated the effect of "SEG"political constraint on the local state-owned enterprises'investment efficiency,corporate performance and enterprise valueThe innovation and research significance of this article cover the following aspects:Firstly,this article makes the political legitimacy and political effectiveness appeal of government and the reform of government's power allocation combined together,proposes and demonstrates the proposition of "SEG" political performance constraint,and researches the effect of "SEG" political performance constraint and intergovernmental fiscal decentralization on the local state-owned enterprises'investment consequences in the same framework of "political centralization,economic decentralization".That reveals the system logic of that how local government impacts on investment consequences of local state-owned enterprises in the existing institutional framework,provides a more complete analysis framework for understanding the logic of power distribution between central government and local government,and the influences of power structure adjustment on the local government's economic behavior as well as economic consequences during Chinese economic transition period.Also,that broadens the research ideas that how political power allocation and government behavior affect enterprise behavior,has important implications for the reform of local government administration mode,and optimizing the power structure between the central and local governments.Secondly,this paper puts the local state-owned enterprises' "SEG" investment behavior as the breakthrough point,researches empirically the impact of the macro basic system(including appeal and assessment of government performance,fiscal decentralization)on the micro enterprises investment behavior as well as its economic consequences,which provides the most direct evidences for government shareholders "political view"(Shleifer&Vishny,1994)that has attracted widespread attention.This article not only continue simultaneously these researches which regards Chinese political centralization and Chinese fiscal decentralization as research perspective,but also enriches the researches including transitional economy state investment theory,influences of political and economic institutional on corporate investment.Thus,this article could help us to deeply understand the influence channels and mechanism of political centralization,economic decentralization and local governments' "SEG" behavior on micro enterprise investment consequences.More,this article provides a new perspective for the interactive research between macro and micro research field.By means of the micro empirical evidences such as local state-owned enterprises' investment consequences,we could evaluate the performance of some macro level system,such as the performance evaluation of Chinese local government,fiscal decentralization system,state-owned assets management system and state-owned enterprise property system.Also,this article could lay theoretical foundation and provide policy guidance for us to rationalize the relationship between government and market and reform other related systemThirdly,in the logical framework of "SEG" political performance constraint and fiscal decentralization,this paper researched these local state-owned enterprises' investment consequences influenced by "quasi officer promotion" incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprise executives,ownership structure and control right allocation,and found that local state-owned enterprises' "SEG" investment behavior and its economic consequence were the result of that controlling shareholders(local government)and its representatives(executives of local state-owned enterprises)grabbed the political private benefits of control such as "economic growth" and "political promotion",there were "grabbing hand" effect and "helping hand" effect between government and enterprise.These results confirms the views "reforming property right"and "peeling policy burden" in the same framework,which could provide theoretical reference for de-administration reform of the state-owned enterprise and developing mixed ownership economy.Lastly,this article starts with the system logic such as Chinese political incentives and political performance evaluation,constructs the measurement index of local government's "SEG"behavior and political performance constraint of local state-owned enterprise,which could open up new ideas about the measure of government action for further research,and provide a bridge for studying the relationship between macro public governance and micro corporate action. |
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