Demand Information Sharing In Product Service Supply Chain With Manufacturerproviding Service

With the great development of service economy,the mutual integration of manufacturing industry and service industry is increasingly obvious.More and more manufacturing enterprises have begun to focus on service and extend their business scope from product field to service field,and they also transform from simply providing product to providing product service system(PSS).With the servitisation transformation of manufacturing enterprises,the traditional product supply chain has gradually evolved into the product service supply chain(PSSC).However,due to the interaction between product and service,supply chain management will face more complex challenges.How to strengthen the cooperation among upstream and downstream enterprises has become an important topic for the collaborative development of the product service supply chain.Nowadays,the continuous changes of business environment have intensified the uncertainty of supply chain management.In order to better respond to the complex and changeable market circumstances,demand information sharing among upstream and downstream enterprises becomes more important.In view of this,this thesis focuses on the issue of demand information sharing in the product service supply chain.Based on decision optimization,contract design and non-cooperative game model,this thesis investigates the service-oriented manufacturing enterprise’s incentive mechanism for demand information sharing and discusses the information sharing strategies of the supply chain under service competition.Firstly,this thesis addresses the problems of demand information sharing and incentive strategy in a supply chain where the manufacturer provides both product and service.We consider a product service supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer.The retailer has private demand forecast information and can choose to share any part of such information with the manufacturer.By constructing a dynamic game model under incomplete information,this thesis analyses the impacts of the retailer’s information sharing level,the manufacturer’s service efficiency and the consumer’s service sensitivity on the service value and the information sharing value.Then,the two-part compensation incentive contract is put forward to achieve complete information sharing in the supply chain.Secondly,this thesis explores the issue of demand information sharing in a supply chain with manufacturer service competition.We consider a supply chain where two competing manufacturers sell through one common retailer.The manufacturers provide supporting service for their own products,while the retailer has private demand forecast information.Through comparing the decisions and profits of supply chain members under different information sharing situations,we investigate the retailer’s demand information sharing strategy.On this basis,the feasible conditions for competitive manufacturers to provide incentives for complete information sharing are discussed.Based on the method of numerical simulation,the influences of the consumer’s service sensitivity,the manufacturer’s service efficiency and the competition intensity on the information sharing revenues of supply chain members are analysed in the end.Thirdly,this thesis focuses on the problem of demand information sharing in competing supply chains with manufacturer service competition.We consider a model of two supply chains,each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer.The manufacturers provide supporting service for their own products while the retailers have imperfect private demand information.By constructing a multi-stage game model under incomplete information,the impacts of demand information sharing on the product pricing and the service decision-making are investigated.Futhermore,based on the analysis of the three effects of information sharing(i.e.,the direct effect,the competitive effect and the spillover effect),the game equilibrium of demand information sharing under price competition and service competition is discussed.Finally,to address the issue of demand information sharing in a product service supply chain under the platform sales mode,we consider two competing manufacturers sell through one common e-commerce platform.The manufacturers provide supporting service for their own products,while the e-commerce platform has more demand information than the manufacturers.By comparing the product prices and the service levels under three different situations of information sharing,the impacts of the e-commerce platform’s information sharing behaviour on the manufacturers’ equilibrium decisions are analyzed.Furthermore,the optimal information sharing strategy of e-commerce platform and its influences on social welfare are discussed.