Research On Information Sharing Strategy In A Supply Chain With Warranty Service

In recent years,with the development of social economy,the competition between enterprises changes from the product price competition into price and after-sale service competition,especially the competition between the enterprises which produce and sell the durable goods with a longer period of use.Consumers who buy the durable goods not only concern about the product price and quality,but also concern about the after-sale warranty service of the products.In fact,in today’s fiercely competitive markets,more and more firms improve their competitiveness by offering a base warranty for their products,and increase their profits by offering an extended warranty for their products.This dissertation studies the problems of information sharing strategy in a supply chain with warranty service.The detailed contents are as follows:Firstly,this dissertation studies the demand forecast information sharing in the supply chain with warranty service.Considering a supply chain with one supplier and one manufacturer,under the warranty cost sharing between the supplier and the manufacturer,information sharing strategies of the manufacturer are analyzed when the manufacturer or the supplier provides the warranty.Moreover,the impacts of the different warranty policies on the supply chain are explored by comparing the two warranty polices.The results show that the manufacturer has an incentive to share the demand forecast information under both warranty policies when the cost efficiency in providing a warranty is high.Moreover,it is found that it will hurt the party who provides the warranty service but benefit the other party.Secondly,this dissertation studies the risk-aversion information sharing in the supply chain with warranty service.Considering a supply chain with one supplier and two competing retailers,there is a price and warranty competition between the retailers.Facing the uncertain market demand,the retailers are risk averse and the risk-aversion levels are their respective private information.Each retailer can choose to disclose its private risk-aversion information to the supplier or choose non-disclosure.The results show that the warranty period added to the product by each retailer is only related to each retailer’s warranty cost efficiency and the consumers’ sensitivity toward warranty.Each retailer is willing to share her risk-aversion level with the supplier only when the real value of her risk-aversion level is lower than the mean value of other participants’ estimation.Furthermore,it is found that the information leakage has a negative effect on the supplier’s profit if it accepts the shared risk-aversion information.Finally,this dissertation studies the product quality information disclosure strategies in the supply chain with warranty service.Considering a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer,when the retailer sells the products to the consumers,it also sells an extended warranty about the product.As a producer,the manufacturer has the private product quality information.It can choose to disclose its private product quality information to the consumers or the retailer.It shows that in the integrated supply chain,the supply chain is willing to disclose its private product quality information to the consumers only when the real product quality level lies in a range of values.That is to say,if the real product quality is very good or very bad,the supply chain will not disclose its quality information.This dissertation enriches the theoretical content of warranty service and information sharing in the supply chain,and reveals the firms’ warranty service strategy and information sharing strategy in the supply chain.Research conclusions can provide reference and guidance for the enterprises in a similar supply chain environment.