| The PPP model refers to a business model in which a government and a private enterprise form a cooperative economic relationship based on a specific public project,and determine the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract in a contractual manner.The advantage of PPP is that the market mechanism is introduced into the field of public projects.The government can solve problems such as insufficient funds and inefficient project management.Private enterprises can obtain the right to construct and operate public projects and obtain economic returns from it.The PPP model is a model widely adopted in the construction and operation of public projects at present,and its goal is to achieve cooperation and exchanges between the government and private enterprises and achieve "win-win" on this basis,in order to achieve the largest total social benefits and create more social benefits to better serve the community and the public.The PPP model was formally applied for the first time in the United Kingdom in 1992,and has now been widely adopted worldwide.It has become one of the core concepts and measures for many governments to achieve their economic goals and improve the level of public services.In recent years,the rapid development of China's urban public facilities,transportation,communications and other public projects has largely benefited from the introduction of the PPP model.However,there are two significant problems in the PPP model,which hinder the smooth implementation of many public projects:first,the lack of cooperation and contractual spirit when some local governments cooperate with private capital,and the lack of compliance with their contracts;and second,the private enterprises are too biased towards self-interests and breaches of contract that undermine the performance of public-private partnerships.Problems in the PPP model are universal in a sense.Solving the above problems cannot be pinned on the return of administrative control,nor can it bring about suficient market-oriented competition,but it is necessary to explore the governance of public projects.At present,the related theoretical research of public project PPP mode is still in its infancy in China,and most of the research is still at the level of project management.The research on the PPP model of public projects in foreign theoretical circles has developed from the level of project management to the level of project governance,but the theoretical results of PPP model governance of public projects in foreign countries are not completely applicable to guide the PPP model of public projects in China due to different implementation environments governance.Extending the research perspective from the management level to the governance level is an inherent requirement of project management theoretical innovation.The analysis of contract governance in many academic schools is considered as an effective analysis tool for project governance mechanism issues.This paper adopts the analysis paradigm of contract theory and transaction cost theory to study the governance mechanism of PPP mode of public projects,which is a relatively new and rarely related perspective of existing related research.The research perspective of this article has changed the traditional project management thinking,and explored the governance mechanism from a more micro perspective,a perspective of reducing transaction costs,and a perspective of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of cooperation among major counterparties.This article discusses the governance effect of the public project PPP model from the perspective of contract relationship governance.There are a large number of asset-specific investments in the PPP model of public projects,which makes this intermediate organization form a great possibility of occupying appropriable quasi-rent,which is also the main factor that generates transaction costs.Taking effective measures to reduce the possibility of defaults related to asset specificity and reduce transaction costs is one of the practical and effective ways to improve the performance of public projects.The related theories of contract incompleteness,asset specificity,implicit contract governance,and flexible contract governance help to correctly understand the operating relationships within a public project PPP model organization and accurately grasp the internal governance structure of a project organization,and seek a public project PPP model a better explanation and governance measures for breaches involved.This will not only help the practice of public project PPP model governance,but also help the further development of public project PPP model governance theory.This article basically follows the research thinking of "proposing questions-literature research-empirical testing-drawing conclusions".Firstly,specific research questions were extracted through observation of typical cases of public project PPP model and literature collection on PPP model governance.Then,the theories of domestic and foreign PPP model governance and contract governance are reviewed in theory and experience,and the contract nature and contract governance model of public project PPP model are discussed.Third,empirically test the governance effects of the contract governance measures of the public project PPP model,and draw research conclusions.This article uses contract theory as a guide to conduct a detailed analysis of public project PPP models,builds the relationship between relevant explanatory variables and explained variables with the help of econometric methods,and tests the relevant data to try to find public project PPPs in theory and experience to discover general governance scheme of the model on occupy appropriable quasi-rent.This article focuses on four issues,with a view to finding governance measures to reduce default in public project PPP models,reduce transaction costs,and promote project performance.(1)As a kind of intermediate organization between the market and enterprises,what is the contractual relationship and the essential characteristics of the public project PPP model?The answer to this question helps to understand the public project PPP model from a clearer and more micro perspective.(2)Which asset-specific investments are specifically involved in the PPP model of public projects?What are the main ways for transaction entities to perform occupy appropriable quasi-rent?What impact do these breaches have on the efficiency of public project PPP models?The answers to these questions help to propose more targeted and effective measures to address breaches of contract and improve the performance of public project PPP models.(3)Explore the governance mechanism of the implicit contract and the empirical test on the governance effect of common breaches of public project PPP models.(4)Explore the governance mechanism of the flexible contract and the empirical test on the governance effect of public project PPP model breach.Flexible contracts do not have much discussion in the current contract theory.This article's discussion on this aspect helps to enrich the content of contract theory to a certain extent.This article draws a series of research conclusions for the problem to be solved.(1)From the perspective of modern contract theory,the essence of the PPP model of public projects is the contract combination concluded by the public project transaction parties,the project organization is a productive contract organization,and the transaction subject is the contract subject.The contract organization of the public project PPP model is a "hybrid organization" with the spontaneous adaptability of the market and the cooperative adaptability of enterprises.Authorizers,contractors,and project users are the main contractual entities.Contractual entities are linked together through a series of contracts to form a contract network.The authorizers of a project are generally in the middle of the contract network.The relationship between the contract subjects is in a dynamic game state.The characteristics of the contract between the contract subjects are relationship embedding,long-term nature,self-fulfillment,and openness of terms.The contracts signed between the public project PPP model contract subjects are "incomplete contracts".(2)Most of the public projects that adopt the PPP model in China are large-scale projects involving all six types of asset specificity defined by Williamson:site specificity,physical asset specificity,human capital specificity,brand assets,dedicated assets,time Specificity.Asset-specific investment has control and incentive functions,and also triggers the contract subject's default behavior.The authorizer's breach of contract is mainly reflected in two aspects:failure to pay the project payment according to the contract and discredit.The contractor's breach of contract is mainly reflected in five aspects:project quality,project progress,project internal management,personnel investment,and equipment and material investment.Defaults caused by asset-specific investments will inevitably cause losses in the operational efficiency of public project PPP models.(3)The implicit contract is to suppress the breach through the "self-performance" mechanism.In the PPP mode of public projects,the meritorious service contest and the life-long responsibility system of project leaders are considered effective implicit contract measures.The implicit contract is considered to play a greater role in managing the foreseeable occupy appropriable quasi-rent,and the explicit contract is considered more as a supplement to the implicit contract.(4)The PPP model of public projects is long-term and complex.Based on considerations of transaction costs,effective governance of the contractual relationships of the main contract parties requires the comprehensive application of multiple contract governance mechanisms.Flexible contracts are also considered to play a significant role in governing the contractual relationship between the authorizer and the contractor.Trust,reliable commitment,renegotiation,and human relations are considered to be concrete and effective flexible contract governance measures.The innovation of this article is mainly reflected in three aspects.(1)This article provides a case study of the public project PPP model for the marketization of public goods production.A large number of asset-specific investments are involved in the PPP model of public projects.The issue of occupying appropriable quasi-rent is the core issue that affects the cooperation efficiency of the main body of the project.In asset-specific investments,occupy appropriable quasi-rent is a lingering problem that permeates all areas of business activity.Starting from solving the problem of occupying appropriable quasi-rent,exploring the governance mechanism of improving the PPP model of public projects has great reference significance for other economic organizations to improve their operational efficiency.(2)The effectiveness of informal contract governance is proposed from the effectiveness of implicit contract and flexible contract governance.Domestic theoretical circles on the governance of public project PPP models have paid more attention to the discussion of formal contracts with legal effect.Many of these discussions have ignored the rigidity and inefficiency of formal contracts.This paper's discussion on the governance effectiveness of informal contracts will help build a more complete public project governance system.(3)For many studies on contract governance,contractual indicators and data are difficult to measure and the acquisition stays at the level of qualitative analysis.This paper uses a quantitative research method to test the contract governance effect of the public project PPP model,and it is a good supplement to the qualitative analysis commonly used now. |
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