Incomplete Surplus Labor Contract Assignment Problem Research

The steadily declining of the labor share has become indisputable fact of China’seconomic and social development. In theory, the initial distribution of the worker that laborwages level mainly depends on both sides signed the labor contract, manifested as contractworkers benefits. Contract income of workers can be divided into two parts: one is based onthe living wage under the framework of contract workers to obtain the fixed income, this partof income for the reservation wages of workers, labor contract is the lowest price, but alsomanagement gets effective labor supply the necessary conditions, it is the labor contractduration bottom line; two is based on the share of wages under the framework of the workersinvolved in contractual labor surplus distribution part. Therefore, the low level of worker inthe initial distribution pays a performance as lower retention wages on the one hand, andunequilibrium distribution of the surplus income of labor contract on the other hand.Established in the supply of labor conditions, labor remuneration level mainly show as theamount of the residual revenue of labor contract.The distribution of surplus labor contract is a multilevel, interdisciplinary complexsubject. Inorder to coordinate the conflict of labor and capital, improve labor returns, thisarticle will mainly research the institutional system cause of labor less surplus share of laborcontract, combined with summarizing the research status at home and abroad and the currentsituation of China’s labor share, then to analyze how institutional system influence theresidual revenue of labor contract. Then we will analyze the relationship among propertyright, government and contract to construct the theory frame. This text will focus on theanalysis the rest the creation process of the residual revenue of labor contract, and thenthrough the analysis the general and special characteristics of the incomplete labor contract,study of the allocation of property rights of incomplete labor contract how infect oncontractual surplus distribution mechanism, so as to explore the intrinsic link between theexisting institutional environment and the amount of residual revenue of labor contract.Then, we will construct a residual distribution model based on the ability of the laborcontract to analyze the cost and revenue of labor. We mainly wanna to description the allocation mechanism of residual revenue of labor contract on the premise of establishedlabor supply and demand conditions, in order to analyze the impact of specific provisions ofthe contract on labor’s negotiation ability, and to make clear remaining difficulties ofequilibrium assignment of residual revenue. In the end, we will put forward how tocoordinate conflicts between labor and capital and protect labor’s contract income. Wemainly emphasize the importance of labor negotiation abilities, and put it link with thethird-party implementation of labor contract, discuss effective ways how to improve labor’snegotiation abilities and increase residual revenue share.The introduction mainly discuss the research background of the topic, review andcritique of domestic and abroad study of distribution of the residual revenue, researchemphasis and difficulty of text, the framework of this text, research methods and probableresearch innovation.Chapter1is the theoretical basis of this paper. This part manily analyze relationshipbetween institutional system, contract and property rights, describe government, propertyright, contract as cores of institutional system how to run the general path, so as toconstruct the theory frame of this text.Chapter2is the reason and influences of steadily declining of labor share. We mainlyelaborate the typical problem as steadily declining of labor share, and then outline thedeclining reasons, we will focus on the instituinal factors such as the from of low salarysystem and its continuation, the segmentation of labor market structure, invalid salarynegotiation system, firm-first third party strength and other aspects of our systemenvironment. Then we analyze the influence of steadily declining of labor share on oureconomy and society development, emphasizing importance and urgency of improvement ofresidual revenue share.Chapter3is production process of residual revenue of incomplete labor contract. Thischapter mainly focus on the production process of residual revenue on the base of analyzetheessence of residual and the residual revenue of incomplete labor contract. The basic ideais residual revenue originate from the execution of labor contract in specific productivityunder the conditions of the labor process, namely the general production process. Then wewill analyze the relationship between the production of residual revenue and the disposition of property rights, we mainly emphasize the importance of disposition of property rightswith the production and distribution of residual revenue.Chapter4is distribution of residual revenue of incomplete labor contract. We firstanalyze the general attributes of incomplete contract and its property rights disposition, andthen we research on the particularity of incomplete labor contract, focus on the propertyrights disposition of incomplete labor contract. Finally, this chapter analyze the efficiency ofself-enforcement of incomplete labor contract. The incompleteness of contract leads toabsence of contract enforcement efficiency. As a typical incomplete contract，enforcement oflabor contract is also inefficiency in the event that labor supply exceeding demand and greatcapital and small labor arrangement of negotiating abilities. So that self-enforcement of laborcontract is also unbalanced, which express in the efficiency gap between undercapitalize andthe best efficiency of specific investments. The government, as a third-party enforcementmechanism, can improve labor’s residual share and ensure persistence of labor-capitalrelations on the premise of no harm to capital’s specific investment motivation by stronginstitutional restriction and labor-first institutional system. And then we can correctunbalanced residual revenue allocation of labor contract and achieve optimizationenforcement efficiency of labor contract.Chapter5is the configuration of negotiation abilities and distribution of residualrevenue. We first summarize the research on the configuration of negotiation abilities, thenmainly study the form and development of the institutional system, which has effect on theconfiguration of negotiation abilities. Then we will research on which terms have influenceon the distribution of residual revenue by establishing a model about labor’s cost andrevenue on the base of contract. And we main aim at how institutional system can impact thelabor’s negotiating abilities, even to the distribution of residual revenue.Chapter6is path selection how to improve the labor’s residual revenue share. This partmainly research on base of Chapter6. Through the analysis of system arrangement in theadvanced restraint system and after remaining redistribution two stage specific, we verify theefficiency optimization of Third-Party enforcement of labor contract on the residualallocation. And we put forward specific ideas and measures to raise labor’s negotiationability and increase labor’s residual revenue share based on the follow-up model analysis in Chapter6.Chapter7is the enforcement of format labor contract. We mainly research on themechanism how format labor contract can improvelabor’s bargaining abilities and increaselabor’s residual revenue share. This part analyze the relevant content of format labor contract,including its concept, characteristics, advantages and disadvantages, the cause of formationand its external effect, as well as its implementation path.